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INTRODUCTION 
It is obvious, although perhaps not readily admitted, that the courts play a central role in 
making policy.  Each disposition that becomes part of a legal doctrine affects the interpretation 
of previous authority and influences future dispositions—that is the nature of precedent.  Given 
this characteristic, it is also true that the district and circuit courts play a profoundly important 
role; the sheer number of cases those courts hear means that their influence is far-reaching.  The 
U.S. Supreme Court may be more visible and more academically attended to, but it is the lower 
courts that handle the bulk of the work in the legal system.  Consequently, in order to understand 
how the courts influence policy, it is critically important to study the dispositions of the district 
and circuit courts. 
 Despite the central role of the lower courts, the state of the scholarship in this area is such 
that they are largely ignored—especially the federal district courts.  A fair number of books and 
articles deal with decision-making in the Supreme Court; fewer focus on the courts of appeals. 
Those that do tend to consider abstract questions, looking at how “the courts” make decisions 
and how “law” is formulated. My interest is both broader and more specific.  I am interested in 
how both the district and circuit courts use and apply Supreme Court precedent as they are 
judging; I am interested in whether and how the courts apply any or all of the broader theoretical 
conceptions of how to use precedent while they complete their daily work. 
 Precedent is a unique political institution.  It is a foundational and familiar piece of U.S. 
law, but at the same time, it remains somewhat mystical.  The legal realists helped to begin a 
more grounded and pragmatic study of precedent and its uses, forcing scholars to abandon the 
idea that law was imbued with a “pristine autonomy” and recognize precedent as a policy tool.1
But in many aspects of the culture, the idea still prevails that applying precedent in some 
mechanistic manner will yield an objectively correct legal result. 
 This reverence of precedent as an institution means that it remains rather insulated from 
public scrutiny.  Because it is relatively difficult to understand and learn precedent, only the 
controversial cases tend to draw much public attention.  Thus, the majority of the judiciary’s 
cases goes unscrutinized by the public.2
It is those largely unscrutinized cases with which I am concerned.  It is relatively easy to 
discover how courts operate in the more controversial substantive areas.  But what happens in the 
vast majority of cases that draw no public scrutiny?  How do courts operate between Supreme 
Court cases providing direction in the area? 
 In order to understand how the lower courts behave between major pronouncements from 
the Supreme Court, I have examined decisions that fall under the rubric of procedural due 
process.  I have chosen to use procedural due process because it is an important area of law—one 
that pits individual liberties questions against concerns about workable and efficient government. 
Procedural due process has an added benefit—it is something that the courts deal with regularly.  
 
1. ROBERT C. POST, CONSTITUTIONAL DOMAINS: DEMOCRACY, COMMUNITY, MANAGEMENT 1
(1995). 
2. For a discussion on extracting precedent from judicial opinions, see Evan H. Caminker, Precedent 
and Prediction: The Forward-Looking Aspects of Inferior Court Decisionmaking, 73 TEX. L. REV. 1, 10–16 (1994). 
2Because lower courts behave differently in different substantive areas, primarily because of 
perceived differences in expertise in certain areas,3 it is important to consider an area where most 
judges believe they are competent enough to handle the cases without deferring widely to 
someone viewed as an expert. 
 My study involved a statistical analysis of 252 cases from the federal district courts and 
the federal courts of appeals.  The sample includes 152 cases from the courts of appeals and 100 
federal district court cases.  After reading those cases, I coded them using fourteen variables that 
appeared frequently in the Supreme Court opinions that set the rules of the doctrine.  The data 
are divided into five subsets to correspond to the time periods surrounding these “signpost” 
cases, which I describe in more detail below.  I then built a series of models to identify trends 
among the different cases.  These models indicate that the lower courts respond to guidance and 
trends from the Supreme Court.  Thus, my research suggests that, at least in the realm of 
procedural due process, courts do not flout precedent, even if they disagree with it.  This finding 
is not shocking in itself, but in a time when many judges are maligned as rogue politicos, it is 
contrary to prevailing wisdom. 
 This paper proceeds in three general parts.  In Part I, I explore the theory and explain the 
background legal framework of judicial decision-making and the policymaking role of the 
courts.  In Part II, I explain procedural due process in considerably more detail, focusing in 
particular on the signpost cases.  Finally, in Part III, I present my examination of the lower court 
cases and discuss my research and conclusions more broadly to consider how what I have found 
comports with generally accepted theories about how courts behave. 
 
I. BACKGROUND AND THEORY 
The structure of the judicial system ensures that the lower courts play a central role in 
shaping the law.  Since the lower courts hear cases first, they are left to grapple with any points 
unanswered in current precedent. Sheer numbers amplify the impact that lower courts have on 
shaping policy; because the Supreme Court simply cannot hear all the cases that might affect 
doctrine, it is often the lower courts that determine the direction the doctrine will move. Thus, as 
David Klein notes, the lower courts may “possess the power to affect legal policy independently 
and substantially.”4
3. David Klein argues that courts behave differently depending on how well suited they believe 
themselves to be to handle the problems facing them.  Courts repeatedly handle certain types of cases.  Search and 
seizure, for example, is very common in the federal courts.  Since judges face these types cases so regularly, the vast 
majority of judges do not perceive that judges on superior courts or particular judges of coordinate rank have any 
expertise advantage that deserves deference.  In cases where judges are less surefooted, however, they are more 
likely to take advantage of the apparent expertise of their colleagues.  In some antitrust or environmental cases, 
judges believe the complexity of the field requires them to rely on perceived experts.  DAVID E. KLEIN, MAKING 
LAW IN THE UNITED STATES COURTS OF APPEALS 67–68 (2002). 
4. KLEIN, supra note 3, at 4 (2002).  Klein writes: 
The truth, well known but often overlooked in the media and even in serious scholarship, is that 
lower court judges play a major role in the development of legal doctrine.  Issues reach them first, 
and higher courts might not address those issues for years afterward if in fact they ever do.  
Furthermore, in many systems courts of equal authority are not bound to heed, or even take note 
of, one another’s decisions when deciding their own cases, even when they are constructing legal 
policy from the same statutes, constitutional provisions, or higher court precedents. 
3Scholars have developed a number of theories about how courts (and the judges who sit 
on them) approach legal problems.  In this Part, I first explain some of those theories about 
decision-making in a hierarchical system.  I then move on to describe research on judicial 
decision-making in particular.  I close with a consideration of the role that precedent plays in a 
hierarchical system. 
 
A. Decision-making in a Hierarchical Judicial System 
 
A study of judicial decision-making first requires recognition of a simple fact: the 
motivations that might influence decision-making operate on a number of levels, from that of the 
individual judge to larger institutional and structural concerns.  A judge might be influenced by 
her own nuances, which might lead to a decision-making style that diverges widely from her 
colleagues.  But on the other hand, general norms about what it means to judge well might have 
an equalizing effect.5 And the two things operating together are likely to combine to yield an 
altogether different impact.  Given the nature of human reasoning, this complex interplay of 
factors ought to come as no surprise.  Some observers, scholars and laypersons alike, however, 
have a tendency to view legal reasoning as essentially divorced from human reasoning.  That is, 
they seem to believe that something inherent in the nature of legal reasoning elevates it to 
something more scientific. 
 Decision-making theory is a broad, rich area of scholarship—one that could easily 
consume the majority of any paper.  My goal here is not to recount the whole of the field but 
instead to provide the background necessary to examine my data.  In particular, I consider the 
two major models of judicial decision-making: the precedent and proxy models. 
 
1. THE PRECEDENT MODEL OF JUDICIAL DECISION-MAKING 
Most scholars who study judicial decision-making at the level of the inferior courts 
adhere to the “precedent model” of decision-making, and my work suggests that this approach is 
generally correct although perhaps not fully descriptive.6 The precedent model is the classical 
model; it is the idea that judges apply their best understanding of the law to the unique facts 
before them.  The role of the judge under the precedent model is to identify relevant sources of 
guiding authority and then “apply some combination of various methods of interpretation in 
order to discern the meaning of those sources.”7 The lower courts do not, under the precedent 
model, speculate as to what their reviewing courts will do. 
 
Caminker writes that “inferior federal courts, as a matter of empirical fact, play a far more important role in the 
actual lives of citizens than does the Supreme Court.”  Caminker, supra note 2, at 3.  See also, Frank B. Cross, 
Decisionmaking in the U.S. Circuit Courts of Appeals, 91 CAL. L. REV. 1457, 1459–60 (2003). 
5. KLEIN, supra note 3, at 138–43. 
6. Caminker, supra note 2, at 8.  Caminker makes this point as he criticizes it; he seeks to apply what 
he calls the “proxy” model.  He writes: 
[T]he overwhelming consensus reflected by judicial and academic discourse holds that lower 
courts ought to define the law merely by interpreting existing precedents, without considering 
what their higher courts would likely do on appeal. 
Id. at 5. 
7. Id. at 9. 
4This model, which I have simplified somewhat for explanatory purposes, suits many 
system observers, for it seems to add certainty and objectivity to the law.  It is, after all, the 
model of common-law precedent.  If all judges do is apply existing law to the issues presently 
before them, then it seems that judges are not engaging in ideological or political activities on the 
bench.  But even though this model is a familiar one, it remains complex.  The persuasive value 
of nonbinding precedent, the process judges actually go through in making such an application, 
and the appropriate role of precedent in the U.S. legal system are important aspects of this model 
to be considered.8
One problem with the precedent model—at least with a simple understanding of the 
precedent model—is that it sometimes creates a misleading appearance of precision in the law.  
It almost gives the impression of legal science—of the possibility of a nearly mathematical 
certainty in the law.  That is, a possible way to view decision-making in this model is that 
precedent supplies equations, and the new cases supply the facts to fill out those equations.  The 
judge’s role, then, is simply to crunch the numbers, which if she followed the proper procedures 
should be legally “correct.”  But law is obviously not math.  Even a precedent-model 
sympathizer would recognize that before a judge can solve the problem, she has to choose which 
equations to apply.  The analogy is also limited more fundamentally, in that facts simply are not 
numbers.  Thirteen mathematicians working out one equation will compute the same answer, 
because numbers will mean the same thing to them regardless of their experiences or ideological 
bents.  Factors along those lines, however, do affect whether a judge is sympathetic to an 
immigrant’s claim of persecution or to a drug-addicted defendant’s plea for leniency. 
 Recognizing that judges are human decision-makers implicates core questions about the 
use of precedent.  Some classical realists took the human aspect of judging quite far, concluding 
that what really mattered in determining the outcome of a case was what the judge had for 
breakfast.9 That, I think, is unsatisfactory.  The question the realists asked to conclude that 
decision-making is essentially idiosyncratic was something like this: if all judges are to do is 
apply the law as it stands, then how can law be so imprecise?  What intrigues me, however, are 
the similarities.  First—is law really that imprecise?  And second—if not, (as I suspected it was 
not and as my data suggest it is not) what is it about precedent that leads to so much similarity in 
the law? 
 One explanation that is particularly persuasive in theory and that bears out in my research 
is that precedent limits judicial decision-making—that is, it constrains interpretation by providing 
a common interpretive framework. 10 In the abstract, this explanation makes sense—readers of 
case law know that most judges generally do not openly flout the law on the books.  Fear of 
overruling likely contributes to the phenomenon of pushing the bounds of the law or 
distinguishing cases instead of open disavowal.  But something more is going on too: most 
would agree that it simply is not good judging to ignore or defy precedent. 
 Those who subscribe to the precedent model also believe that predictions of future 
judicial behavior generally do not affect decision-making.  That is, (returning once again to the 
mathematical analogy), just as proving Riemann’s hypothesis will not affect what two plus two 
 
8. Id. 
9. See generally Brian Leiter, American Legal Realism, in THE BLACKWELL GUIDE TO PHILOSOPHY 
OF LAW & LEGAL THEORY (W. Edmundson & M. Golding eds., 2003). 
10. Caminker, supra note 2, at 10; see also Mark J. Richards & Herbert M. Kritzer, Jurisprudential 
Regimens in Supreme Court Decision Making, AM. POL. SCI. REV., Vol. 96, No. 2, at 305 (June 2002). 
5equals, neither should the possibility that the Supreme Court might conclude that an individual’s 
fundamental liberty interest precludes legislatures from criminalizing homosexual sodomy affect 
whether a law preventing gay couples from adopting children may stand.  But that does not seem 
reasonable.  Courts must pay attention to legal developments; that is one of the only things that 
would justify distinguishing certain precedent based on things like its age.  It is only valid for a 
district judge, in particular, to use that type of reasoning if the judge believes that a reviewing 
court would overrule the precedent.  And, in fact, thinking about how the particular case at bar 
fits into the larger legal scheme is a central component of judging. 
In sum, the precedent model tells only part of the story.  These cases are not decided in 
isolation; they relate to society and to one another.  These relationships lead to inconsistency in 
decision-making because they are not abstract; the culture and context of the cases affects the 
outcome.  Appellate judges will consider how lower judges are likely to interpret the opinion and 
will in turn craft the opinion in a way most likely to obtain compliance.  Or, conversely, if the 
law needs developing or is particularly controversial, an appellate judge might craft the opinion 
in such a way as to leave more room for interpretation by the district courts.11 The district court 
judges must then fill in the blanks.  Accordingly, even in a precedent-model system, some 
predictive or proxy decision-making certainly takes place. 
 
2. THE PROXY MODEL OF JUDICIAL DECISION-MAKING 
While it is plain that judges do engage in predictive reasoning, even if they do not 
articulate their processes, the proxy model remains more controversial than the precedent model.  
Lower court judges applying the proxy model must apply the rule that they predict a reviewing 
court would apply. The U.S. Supreme Court is the most relevant court for all decision-makers of 
lower rank; all judges would likely consider how the Justices would resolve the case if they 
heard it.  Thus, the proxy model is a top-down model of decision-making.12 
But although the proxy model is more predictive, its point is not to decentralize the power 
in the federal judicial system.  That is, under the proxy model, the lower courts are not part of 
any design to distribute the Supreme Court’s power.  The lower courts exist only because 
resource constraints prevent the Supreme Court from hearing all cases filed; they “are merely 
intended to facilitate universal access to the Court’s edicts.”13 
Some scholars consider the proxy model controversial because it contemplates a different 
type of role for judges.  Where the precedent model more directly suggests precision in the law 
and implies that there is such a thing as an independently ascertainable correct answer, the proxy 
model explicitly incorporates guesswork and prediction.  Instead of applying settled rules to new 
facts, judges are hypothesizing as to what the new rules might be. 
 As discussed above, if the judicial system is conceptualized in terms of the precedent 
model, then a logical and justifiable facet of the lower courts’ role is to predict the Supreme 
Court’s decisions, which requires prediction and application of the Court’s decision-making 
process.  This process requires a holistic approach to the Court’s decisions and is based on the 
notion that the key piece of previous court opinions is the case rule.  All that matters for the 
 
11. Caminker, supra note 2, at 11–12; see also KLEIN, supra note 3, at 134–36 (discussing intercourt 
dynamics). 
12. Caminker, supra note 2, at 16. 
13. Id. 
6lower court judge is the rule of law for which the case stands.  This description is rigid, and its 
strict application does not accurately describe the reality of the precedent model.  But in theory, 
that is the precedent model. 
 Lower courts applying the proxy model, on the other hand, must absolutely eschew such 
a rigid approach to judging.  The strict rules of cases are themselves narrow, regardless of how 
broad they may be in scope.  In Brandenburg v. Ohio,14 for example, the rule that government 
may not proscribe speech unless is incites imminent lawless action and is likely to incite such 
action promulgates a neat legal test.  But divorced from the context of the case, it is nearly 
impossible to understand how to apply the test itself.  The context of the opinion is critical; it is 
necessary to go to the dicta of the case to understand the scope of that test.  Certainly, it would be 
necessary to do so, even in applying the precedent model.  But a proxy decision-maker must do 
much more.  Since the task of the proxy decision-maker is essentially to predict the next 
doctrinal development, it is necessary to consider speech doctrine as a whole, American speech 
ideals themselves, and established patterns by the relevant decision-makers: the Justices.15 
The proxy model is controversial for many scholars because it appears to turn the concept 
of adjudication on its head.  Judges are supposed to adjudicate, the criticism goes, based on what 
the law is, not based on what they think the law might become. A judge applying the proxy 
model is accordingly undermining precedent, or the very thing that gives law any sense of 
determinacy.  As with a rigid precedent-model approach, this criticism reflects a rigid and 
perhaps outdated concept of the nature of the judicial system.  Some prediction is simply 
inevitable.16 
3. JUDICIAL DECISION-MAKING ON AN INDIVIDUAL LEVEL 
Although the abstract theories help to explain the process of judicial decision-making, it 
is important to recognize, as the realists did, that judges are individuals with their own 
idiosyncrasies.  I do not mean to suggest that judges are unprincipled, nor do I mean to ascribe 
such a suggestion to the realists.  My research, which is consistent with other work in the field, 
suggests that while personal ideology cannot be discounted, judges do tend to follow precedent 
and that decisions follow apparent ideological trends from the reviewing courts.17 These 
observations suggest a blend between precedent and proxy reasoning.  The question again 
becomes why. 
A few scholars have studied this question extensively.  David Klein, for example, has 
considered how appellate judges use their power to shape law and why they act as they do in 
certain circumstances.18 He specifically studied how judges use nonbinding precedent, whether 
they follow the lead of certain judges, and what factors made them more or less likely to do so. 
In one study, Klein conducted an empirical and interview study of lawmaking in the U.S. 
courts of appeals and concluded that although the decision-making process is complex and 
 
14. 395 U.S. 444 (1969) 
15. Caminker explains the proxy model in considerably more detail.  See Caminker, supra note 2, at 
16–22 (1994) 
16. Id. at 22–23. 
17. David E. Klein & Robert J. Hume, Fear of Reversal as an Explanation of Lower Court 
Compliance, 37 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 579, 579 (2003) (citing a variety of empirical studies). 
18. KLEIN, supra note 3, at 4. 
7multifaceted, some common themes do emerge.19 One important predictor of judicial decision-
making that Klein reported was, perhaps unsurprisingly, ideology.20 That is, Klein found that 
much of the time, judges voted as one would expect them to vote given their political affiliation 
or given the party identity of the president who appointed them. 
These conclusions are in line with those of the attitudinalists—most notably Harold 
Spaeth and Jeffrey Segal.  Attitudinalism is essentially the empirical version of legal realism; the 
theory uses social science to confirm that policy preferences are the driving force behind judicial 
decisions.  Spaeth and Segal, in their seminal work applying the attitudinal model to the Supreme 
Court, identified a statistically significant correlation with apparent ideologies of the Justices and 
the outcome of cases.21 The core of this model is that a judge’s own values play a central factor 
in judicial decision-making.  While the force of precedent may influence a judge, it will not in 
the end keep her from acting in accordance with her policy preferences.  Spaeth and Segal 
focused primarily on how the Justices voted, as opposed to the content of the opinions.  After 
identifying the ideological positions of the Justices, Spaeth and Segal found that the Justices 
frequently voted as their ideologies predicted.  Other scholars—notably Daniel R. Pinello’s 
ambitious meta-analysis of studies from 1959 through 1998 have confirmed Spaeth and Segal’s 
results and extended the theory to the lower courts.22 
Cass Sunstein, David Schkade, and Lisa Michelle Ellman attempted to tease out some 
nuances of ideology and found evidence supporting hypotheses that in many substantive areas of 
law, a judge’s votes can be predicted by the party of the appointing president, that a judge’s 
ideological tendencies will often be amplified if the panel has two other judges appointed by an 
appointing president of the same political party, and that a judge’s ideological tendencies will 
often be dampened if the panel has no other judge appointed by an appointing president of the 
same political party.23 This study also concluded that although ideology is generally a good 
predictor of how a judge will vote, it failed to predict accurately in criminal appeals, takings 
claims, and Commerce Clause challenges. Additionally, in cases involving abortion and the 
death penalty, only the ideology of the judge seemed to matter; that is, panel composition did not 
seem to play a role in how a judge voted.24 Ideology, then, must tell only part of the story. 
Scholars have noted that other factors—other more normative factors—may have a far 
greater impact in judicial decision-making.  Some of these factors help to explain why ideology 
does not seem to matter much in the three substantive areas identified in the Sunstein study.  
Klein notes that judges crafting new legal rules will consider how favorably that rule will likely 
be treated in the future.25 This consideration is important; it is a process a judge goes through to 
check her legal reasoning.  That is, if the judge does not believe that the new rule will stand up to 
 
19. Id. at 7–8. 
20. Id. at 133. 
21. JEFFREY A. SEGAL & HAROLD J. SPAETH, THE SUPREME COURT & THE ATTITUDINAL MODEL 
REVISITED 110–14 (2002). 
22. Daniel R. Pinello, Linking Party to Judicial Ideology in American Courts: A Meta-Analysis, 20 
JUST. SYS. J. 219 (1999); see also Emerson H. Tiller & Frank B. Cross, What is Legal Doctrine?, 100 NW. U. L. 
REV. 517 (2006) (discussing trends in legal scholarship, particularly with regard to the role of ideology in decision-
making); Barry Friedman, The Politics of Judicial Review, 84 TEX. L. REV. 257, 272–74 (2005). 
23. Cass Sunstein, David Schkade & Lisa Michelle Ellman, Ideological Voting on Federal Courts of 
Appeals: A Preliminary Analysis, 90 VA. L. REV. 301, 333–47 (2004). 
24. Id. at 306. 
25. KLEIN, supra note 3, at 81, 134. 
8criticism from her colleagues, that might be an indication that her reasoning is suffering from 
some flaw that must be remedied; it might be an indication that she is not reasoning in a “good” 
or proper legal manner.  Barry Friedman described an emerging consensus among positive 
scholars that precedent carries substantial weight in the lower courts and possibly in the Supreme 
Court as well.26 
Building in part on this consensus, some positive scholars have examined how the 
precedent or proxy models are used in practice.  That is, if precedent matters to judges (as it 
surely must), how do they use it?  Klein’s work casts doubt on the notion that lower-court judges 
engage in predictive reasoning per se.  He writes, “For their part, circuit judges seemed to act 
with little regard for what the Supreme Court might think.  The Supreme Court’s past views, as 
expressed in precedents, counted for a good deal in both the interviews and the written opinions; 
its current or future views mattered far less.”27 He does note that judges do engage in some 
predictive reasoning, but his research suggests that, by and large, precedent as it stands is really 
what matters. 
Given this conclusion, Klein considered under what circumstances and to what degree 
judges rely on precedent.  He considered a number of factors, including ideological distance 
from the authoring judge, perceived expertise and prestige of the authoring judge, existence of 
dissents, level of existing support for the rule, and decisional difficulty.28 His empirical study 
found that the ideological distance variable significantly affected whether a judge followed or 
distinguished precedent; that perceived expertise was significant in technical cases in which 
judges believed themselves not to be expert (such as antitrust); and that perceived prestige of an 
authoring judge had its strongest effect in cases where a relatively new judge relied upon the 
opinion of an established and prestigious judge. The results for the effects of nonunanimous 
precedent, existing support for the rule, and decisional difficulty were ambiguous.29 
In addition to those variables, some scholars theorize that fear of reversal plays an 
important role.30 Klein and Hume, however, analyzed search and seizure cases from 1961 to 
1990 to conclude that fear of reversal cannot account for widespread circuit compliance with 
precedent.31 They note that judges, instead of acting more cautiously in the cases that seemed to 
have a better chance of attracting Supreme Court review, were less likely to decide these cases as 
the Supreme Court predictably would.32 Thus, the congruence among opinions cannot be 
explained away simply by invoking fear of reversal.33 Certainly, as precedent-model enthusiasts 
would assert, this congruence is attributable at least in part to processes of reasoning.34 It is 
 
26. Friedman, supra note 22, at 274–75 
27. KLEIN, supra note 3, at 134. 
28. Id. at 63–72. 
29. Id. at 81–85. 
30. See generally Klein & Hume, supra note 17. 
31 . Id. at 579. 
32. Id. at 597. 
33. Some possible reasons for this congruence include ideology, timesaving decisional shortcuts, and 
attempts to reach legally sound decisions.  For further discussion, see id. at 601–02. 
34. KLEIN, supra note 3, at 138–42.  Judges have similar ideas about what it means to judge and what 
it means to engage in sound legal reasoning.  Given the ideas are similar, it is not terribly surprising that opinions 
converge. 
9sensible that judges, who have similar training, applying the analogic process of legal reasoning 
would arrive at similar conclusions in cases with well-settled rules. 
All this individual-level background work can be expanded out to a more abstract 
examination of what drives judicial decisions.  Frank Cross uses four constructs to categorize 
decision-making: the legal model, the political or attitudinal model, the strategic model, and the 
litigant-driven model.35 His work, like that of Klein and Hume, suggests that judges use a blend 
of prediction and precedent in their work but are by and large constrained by ideas about what 
constitutes effective judging. 
The legal model holds that the legal reasons that a judge articulates in cases reflect the 
actual logic that the judge followed in deciding the case.  The political or attitudinal model states 
that a judge’s ideological preferences drive the outcomes of the cases.  The strategic model 
builds on the political model to suggest that although judges use their own ideological 
predilections to decide cases, they do so in a sophisticated manner and consider external 
responses to their decisions.  Finally, the litigant-driven model teaches that judicial outcomes are 
determined by the strategic assessments of the litigating parties and their incentives.36 
Cross used data on the U.S. courts of appeals to build a number of models to test each of 
these theories.37 The study revealed that the hypotheses that judges use the legal and political 
decision-making models are supported by the data, but the strategic and litigant-driven models 
are not.  Thus, the data suggest that judges are influenced both by concerns about what makes 
good law (legal decision-making) and what makes good policy (political and ideological 
decision-making). 
 
4. INSTITUTIONAL DECISION-MAKING 
The scholarship that I have presented thus far focuses on the judiciary and its internal 
operations; they consider decision-making from the perspective of the judges and their 
relationships with each other and with other components of the judiciary.  Although this work is 
critically important to understanding how the judiciary operates, it only tells part of the story.38 
In order to gain a rich understanding of the courts and their role in the policymaking process, it is 
important to consider how judges conceive of their work in the political sphere.  John Ferejohn 
and Bill Eskridge’s work in modeling the lawmaking and decision-making process between 
Congress and the president as a sequential game has, I think, important implications for the 
judiciary.39 The game theoretic aspects of this model are complex; it is not necessary to have a 
technical understanding of the model to appreciate its application to the courts.  Accordingly, I 
focus on a qualitative summary, which is more useful for the purposes of my research. 
The model is relatively straightforward from a qualitatively theoretical standpoint.  The 
theory begins at the status quo—at events in place absent any legislation aimed at a particular 
 
35. Cross, supra note 4, at 1461–62; see also Frank B. Cross, Explaining U.S. Circuit Court Decision 
Making, 88 JUDICATURE 30 (2004). 
36. Cross, supra note 4, at 1461–62. 
37. Id. at 1497–1514. 
38. Studying judicial decision-making empirically is also not without criticism.  See, e.g., Harry T. 
Edwards, The Effects of Collegiality on Judicial Decision Making, 151 U. PA. L. REV. 1639, 1656 (2003); Harry T. 
Edwards, Collegiality and Decision Making on the D.C. Circuit, 84 VA. L. REV. 1335 (1998). 
39. William Eskridge, Jr. & John Ferejohn, The Article I, Section 7 Game, 80 GEO. L.J. 523 (1992). 
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problem.40 Representatives with policy preferences diverging from that status quo will attempt to 
write new legislation, which requires working with committees.  Draft legislation, in order to 
pass in the House, must appeal to the median legislator.  It also must appeal to the Senate, for the 
bill must pass that chamber as well.  Both the House and the Senate must consider how the 
president will act, and as the president has veto power, they must act accordingly.  “Each 
participant in the game wants to impose its own policy preferences on federal statutory policy, 
but in most cases none will act in a way that subjects it to an immediate override.  Each 
participant anticipates the moves that will be made by the next participants.”41 
This model applies to the courts, I think, in that judges consider which institution is best 
suited to take the next step on a particular issue.42 One question constantly involved in judicial 
decision-making is whether intervening is an appropriate thing for a court to do.  This 
consideration comes up more significantly in rights cases or in cases with a countermajoritarian 
thrust to them.  The very nature of that consideration reveals that courts engage in at least some 
type of strategic or institutional decision-making. 
For example, imagine a case where a court is asked to review the application of a broadly 
sweeping statute in a particular case.  Some judges would argue that it is the court’s duty to 
apply the statutes as written so as not to expand the reach of statutes beyond which Congress did 
not intend. 43 If the statute suffered a constitutional infirmity, then the judge has no recourse but 
to invalidate it; so-called judicial surgery is an inappropriate technique.  Other judges would 
argue that the judges have more flexibility.  They believe that courts are partners in the 
interpretive enterprise, and it is wholly appropriate—even commanded—that they interpret 
statutes in a reasonable manner to effectuate the obvious goals of Congress.44 
The policy consideration here is important.  If a judge invalidates the statute, it is no 
longer law.  Thus, whatever Congress was attempting to regulate goes unregulated.  It is 
possible, of course, that Congress will immediately attend to the flawed statute and revise it to 
comport with constitutional standards.  But it is also possible that the statute will fall to the 
bottom of Congress’s agenda.  Who the next decision-maker will be is an important 
consideration; the answer influences what the law will look like and whether there will be a law 
at all. 
A case example might make this point more clear.  In United States v. Marshall,45 the 
Seventh Circuit considered whether a statute prescribing mandatory minimum sentencing terms 
for certain weights of drugs should include the weight of the carrier medium.46 The statute did 
not contain a limiting principle per se, but it did specifically exclude the carrier medium for 
certain drugs.  In an en banc decision written by Judge Easterbrook, the Seventh Circuit decided 
 
40. Id. Eskridge’s legislation text provides an accessible summary of this article.  WILLIAM N. 
ESKRIDGE, PHILIP P. FRICKEY & ELIZABETH GARRETT, LEGISLATION 76–78 (2001). 
41. Eskridge & Ferejohn, supra note 39, at 77. 
42. Id. at 75–76. 
43. See generally Frank H. Easterbrook, Statutes’ Domains, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 533 (1983). 
44. See, e.g., HENRY M. HART & ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS IN THE 
MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAW 1374–80 (Eskridge & Frickey, eds. 1994). 
45. 908 F.2d 1312 (1990).  See also Caminker, supra note 2, at 31–32 (1994) (discussing statutory 
reconstruction in the Supreme Court). 
46. 908 F.2d at 1314–15. 
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to include the weight of the carrier medium for LSD in making the weight calculations.47 Judge 
Posner dissented, arguing the statute violated the Equal Protection Clause and must, therefore, be 
unconstitutional.48 Both Judge Easterbrook’s and Judge Posner’s opinions represent relatively 
formalistic approaches to statutory interpretation.  They reach their conclusions without explicit 
regard for who the next decision-maker would be, and without regard for any institutional 
constraints that the next decision-maker might face. 
Judge Cummings, however, took a slightly different approach in his dissent.  He looked 
more carefully at different types of legislative history and concludes that Congress simply could 
not have intended the statutory calculation to include the carrier medium.  He then proceeded to 
revise the statute in a way that would comport with his perception of Congress’s goals.  This 
willingness to examine the history certainly offers insight into Judge Cummings’s interpretive 
approach, and it also reveals a certain type of institutional reasoning and even deference.  In 
some situations, what Congress was trying to do might be so obvious that it is actually more 
deferential to perform judicial surgery than it is to send it back to Congress for revision.  The 
opinion, by reading in the limiting factor, recognizes that Congress is faced with monumental 
time and political constraints.  It shows that the judge recognizes that at this particular juncture, 
the court is best suited to correct the obvious mistake and move on.  His opinion, then, represents 
more of a partnership approach to the law than does the Easterbrook majority or the Posner 
dissent. 
This sequential game functions on a court-to-court level as well.  When a reviewing court 
remands a case, the appellate judge must decide what to say—what type of instructions to 
provide the district court.  Some reviewing courts are very explicit but others simply send the 
case back to the trial court.  In cases that do not involve direct review, courts may consider which 
jurisdiction might get the next case on a particular issue.  Since the court currently hearing a case 
may not be able to bind the next court, the judges will consider how to craft precedent so that its 
persuasive value is most likely to encourage that court to adopt its reasoning. 
 
B. The Role of Precedent and Interaction Among the Courts in a Hierarchical System 
The question of proper use of precedent is always complicated.  In studying across courts, 
the jurisdictional questions are very important, and the role of precedent becomes quite complex.  
The simple proposition that precedent from superior courts binds a lower court is certainly true, 
but it is not particularly helpful in a broader sense.  Distinguishing prior cases and arguing that 
prior holdings were misunderstood or no longer apply is, after all, the nature of lawyering. 
 Given that precedent is both so central and so malleable, it is important to consider the 
role of precedent in a hierarchical judicial system.  Precedent is the fundamental way that judges 
talk to one another in the professional realm.  Judges not only decide cases but also use the 
opinions to expand on the concepts articulated and propose justifications for the rules set forth.  
Opinion writing certainly is an important part of legal reasoning, but it is also an important part 
of dialectical policymaking in the courts. 
 But why the U.S. legal system relies so heavily on precedent is not obvious.  The idea 
that courts should respect past decisions dates at least back to medieval times, although the 
 
47. Id. 
48. Id. at 1317–18. 
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nature of the reliance has shifted over the years.49 Precedent does, of course, provide some sense 
of certainty and rightness in the law.  Relying on that which has come before cuts against the 
perception that all judges are doing in deciding cases is writing new law.  It indicates that there 
are rules to the game and a common language among professionals.  In a system with such 
power, these indications are important to its legitimacy.50
The role of precedent in a hierarchical judicial system also implicates important questions 
about the nature of judicial power.  It is possible to conceive of a system with a strong adherence 
to precedent as one that empowers the judges who hold the power to bind more than it does with 
the lower court judges.  The lower courts, under this conception, may seem to be mere vessels 
for the superior courts. 
But even under an aggressive precedent system, this conception of the lower courts is not 
necessary or self-evident.  For one, courts do not necessarily use precedent in this manner; the 
lower courts have a good deal of flexibility in applying even binding law.  And second, a system 
that relies on precedent reflects an idea of the hierarchical judicial system that views judges as 
partners in the lawmaking enterprise.  Again, “[t]he contours of a system of precedential 
authority are not natural but contingent and pragmatically determined.”51 
The backward-focused nature of precedent can make some more pragmatic jurists and 
scholars uncomfortable.  If the goal is to apply the law as it is understood to the current situation 
so as to reach the best resolution possible, then it seems that the past is, in some ways, the wrong 
lens to use.  The maxim that one should not forget history is true in law as well, but 
understanding precedent does not explain reverence for the past.  The hierarchical system could 
be one where judges looked to see what became of the cases that came before but then applied 
new models to predict future outcomes.  And even in a system that relies on precedent, it may be 
that the judges do just that. 
 
C. What Is Missing From Research on the Lower Courts 
 
This paper represents an attempt to study the nature of precedent empirically—that is, to 
use statistics and law to obtain an understanding of how judges actually use precedent and to 
opine as to why they use it as they do.  Scholars have studied in much detail all that I have 
discussed in this Part.  But although the scholarship on these topics is rich, it is by and large 
abstract.  The most extensive scholarship focuses on “the court” as an abstract institution.  
Scholars who do focus on the courts as comprised of live decision-makers with a variety of 
motives tend to focus mostly on the Supreme Court or on the courts of appeals.52 How different 
courts interact—including those of like and of disparate rank—is generally less studied. 
In order to understand this interaction, this study focuses on how the district and appellate 
courts use and apply Supreme Court precedent, and how in turn those courts shape the law.  This 
examination requires a substantive area of law with relatively straightforward rules and a number 
of cases with significant precedential importance.  These cases—which I have called signpost 
cases—are those cases that represent some affirmative rule or pronouncement from the Supreme 
 
49. Richard W. Murphy, Separation of Powers and the Horizontal Force of Precedent, 78 N.D. L. 
REV. 1075, 1085 (2003).  Murphy provides a detailed history of precedent in early American history. 
50. For discussion on this point, see Caleb Nelson, Stare Decisis and Demonstrably Erroneous 
Precedents, 87 VA. L. REV. 1, 3–4 (2001) 
51. Caminker, supra note 2, at 32. 
52. E.g., Richards & Kritzer, supra note 10; SEGAL & SPAETH, supra note 21. 
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Court regarding the nature of the substantive law.  They are the cases where the Supreme Court 
speaks on an issue to resolve a tension or prescribe some type of new procedure.  An area of 
substantive law particularly well suited for such a study is procedural due process. 
Procedural due process is an ideal focus because courts face these problems often.  
Because judges do address procedural due process issues on a fairly regular basis, they are 
generally quite comfortable with the subject matter and more confident in their own expertise.  
While some judges will defer more readily to colleagues they perceive as experts in more 
abstruse substantive areas of law, more judges are comfortable with their skill in disposing of 
procedural due process cases and therefore less likely to defer to perceived experts.  Thus, the 
pattern of relying on precedent is less likely to be biased by deference to experts.53 Before 
explaining my results, I first offer a sketch of my selection procedure and of the signpost cases 
themselves. 
 
II. PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS: THE SUBSTANTIVE AREA AND THE SUPREME COURT 
SIGNPOSTS 
Procedural due process is an important area of law because it forces courts to confront a 
key question that is central to American constitutional history: what comprises constitutionally 
protected liberty and property under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments?  The answer to this 
question is significant in the field of procedural due process and in many other substantive areas 
of law.  Procedural due process cases, much like more widely studied and criticized cases in the 
field of substantive due process, ultimately require courts to define the flexible concepts of 
liberty and property.  Moreover, these cases require that judges grapple with fundamental 
background questions of how to define those terms—that is, as Sullivan and Gunther point out in 
their casebook, courts must “identify the appropriate sources for giving content to the meaning of 
liberty and property.”54 
Procedural due process is text-based and therefore seemingly more straightforward and 
uncontroversial than substantive due process.  The relevant portion of the Fifth Amendment 
provides that “No person shall be . . . deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of 
law.”55 Likewise, the relevant portion of the Fourteenth Amendment mandates that “No . . . State 
[shall] deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.”56 But even 
though the textual basis for procedural due process is relatively bounded, the field of potential 
cases is vast and involves related fields of law, many of which are quite complex.57 
In order to limit any bias that might result from sampling different subsets of procedural 
due process, I limited my inquiry to benefits and right-to-hearing cases, which tend to involve 
the same considerations and are again relatively straightforward.  Given that the time in which 
cases were decided is important to a consideration of whether the lower courts respond to or fuel 
doctrinal changes, I also considered the development of the doctrine in this area.  Historically, 
the scope of procedural due process has been rather narrow.  While substantive due process 
considers the general ability to legislate on a particular issue or in a particular manner, 
 
53. Klein points out that this deference can be problematic.  KLEIN, supra note 3, at 63–66; 93–96. 
54. KATHLEEN M. SULLIVAN & GERALD GUNTHER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 590 (14th ed. 2001). 
55. U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
56. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. 
57. ERISA, for example, often interacts with procedural due process. 
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procedural due process is concerned primarily with the procedures the government used in 
arriving at some factual or legal decision.58 In the 1970s, however, the procedural due process 
cases—particularly the right to hearing cases—took a different tack.  Starting in the early 1970s, 
the Supreme Court in right-to-hearing case increasingly found the claimed interest, albeit 
significant to the individual, not included within the constitutional notion of “liberty” or 
“property” to begin with.  That is, the focus changed from whether the government had used fair 
procedures to whether the end toward which the procedures were directed was itself worthy of 
constitutional concern. 
My final sample involved a total of 252 cases from the federal courts allocated across the 
years in which the Supreme Court decided the procedural due process signpost cases.  The 
sample includes 152 cases from the U.S. courts of appeals and 100 cases from the U.S. district 
courts.  The sample is divided about equally among the five time periods built around the 
signposts.  Before explaining my sampling procedure and research in more detail, it is important 
to understand how the Supreme Court has shaped the field.  Toward that end, I consider the 
general doctrine of procedural due process as it evolved in the Supreme Court but focus on how 
developments affect benefits and right-to-hearing cases.  In the interest of completeness, this 
general exposition of the law contains more cases than those I use as Supreme Court signposts.  
Understanding the rich doctrine requires a more complete inquiry; considering the development 
of the law in a meaningful manner demands an abridged one. 
 
A. Pre-Goldberg: The Right to a Meaningful Hearing 
 
The early procedural due process cases display a more technical due process 
jurisprudence; courts were primarily concerned with the types of procedures government bodies 
used to arrive at some decision.  Much of the early controversy centered on adequacy of notice 
for widely recognized liberty or property interests.59 Traditional property ownership, family 
rights, and predetention hearings were the themes of the day. 
A typical case is Armstrong v. Manzo, where the Supreme Court held that a provision in 
Texas’s adoption law that permitted adoption without the consent of the biological father where 
the father did not contribute substantially to the support of the child for a specified time period 
violated the biological father’s due process rights.60 In Armstrong, the Court expressed particular 
concern with the lack of advance notice to the biological father, writing that failure to give the 
petitioner notice of the pending proceeding violated “the most rudimentary demands of due 
process law.”61 The Court further noted that the Texas court was wrong in its decision that 
permitting the biological father to make a motion to set aside the decree corrected the 
constitutional mistake.62 The error in that decision, according to the Court, was that the cure for 
the constitutional wrong placed a higher burden on the biological father; he had to overcome an 
 
58. See, e.g., Peter J. Rubin, Square Pegs and Round Holes: Substantive Due Process, Procedural 
Due Process, and the Bill of Rights, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 833, 847–49 (2003). 
59. E.g., Schroeder v. City of New York, 371 U.S. 208 (1962) (regarding riparian rights); Walker v. 
Hutchinson City, 352 U.S. 112 (1956) (regarding trespass); New York v. New York, N.H. & H.R. Co., 344 U.S. 293 
(1953) (regarding railroad liens). 
60. 380 U.S. 545, 546-47 (1965). 
61. Id. at 550; see also id. at 548 (“During this entire period the petitioner was not given, and did not 
have, the slightest inkling of the pendency of these adoption proceedings.”) 
62. Id. at 550–51. 
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adverse decree.63 Thus, the legal procedures employed to adjudicate this adoption were unequal 
and unfair to the interested parties. 
 
B. What is a Meaningful Hearing in the Context of the New Property?: Goldberg and
Charles Reich 
The focus on the procedures themselves began to relax when the Court began to refine its 
concepts of liberty and property.  The landmark case in the field of procedural due process is the 
1970 case, Goldberg v. Kelly,64 which established that procedural due process required 
pretermination hearings for welfare recipients that permitted them to provide oral testimony 
before their public assistance payments were discontinued.65 Driving the determination in this 
case was a broader and more fluid notion of what constitutes “property” in the modern 
administrative state. 
Pre-Goldberg, the Court established that “[t]he fundamental requisite of due process of 
law is the opportunity to be heard”66 and that the hearing must be “at a meaningful time and in a 
meaningful manner.”67 Part of the Goldberg revolution was the notion that in order for a hearing 
to be meaningful in the welfare context, it had to take place before those benefits were 
terminated.  The Court held that in public benefits cases, due process principles “require that a 
recipient have timely and adequate notice detailing the reasons for a proposed termination, and 
an effective opportunity to defend by confronting any adverse witnesses and by presenting his 
own arguments and evidence orally.”68 
In his majority opinion, Justice Brennan cited Charles Reich’s influential scholarship, 
which argued that property in the modern administrative state no longer consisted solely of 
common-law concepts such as land ownership and bundle-of-sticks type property.69 Instead, 
Reich argued and Brennan agreed, contemporary society is built on entitlements.  Entitlements 
including government subsidies, social security, and welfare benefits, are not gratuities provided 
by the government out of its beneficence.  Instead, “to the recipients [the entitlements]  are 
essential, fully deserved, and in no sense a form of charity.”70 This argument swayed Brennan, 
who wrote, “the crucial factor in this context . . . is that termination of aid pending resolution of a 
controversy over eligibility may deprive an eligible recipient of the very means by which to live 
while he waits.”71 
63. Id. at 551. 
64. 397 U.S. 254 (1970) 
65. Id. at 264–65. 
66. Grannis v. Ordean, 234 U.S. 385, 394 (1914). 
67. Armstrong, 380 U.S. at 552.  For criticism of the Brennan’s use of the Reich concept, see 
generally Richard A. Epstein, No New Property, 56 BROOK. L. REV. 747 (1990). 
68. Goldberg, 397 U.S. at 267–68. 
69. Id. at 263 n.8.  See also, Charles Reich, Individual Rights and Social Welfare: The Emerging 
Legal Issues, 74 YALE L.J. 1245 (1965); Charles Reich, The New Property, 73 YALE L.J. 733 (1964). 
70. Reich, supra note 69, at 1255. 
71. Goldberg, 397 U.S. at 264. 
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Goldberg is commonly considered the high-water mark of procedural due process law.72
Almost immediately, the Court added qualifications to the Goldberg pretermination hearing 
principle that significantly limited the doctrine’s reach.  In the end, it may be that the case 
promised a much broader right than it actually delivered.73 
C. The Retreat from Goldberg: Deference to the State and the Concern for Workable 
Government 
 
1. DEFINING PROPERTY AND LIBERTY IN THE MODERN ADMINISTRATIVE STATE 
Goldberg marked an expansive concept of property and a correspondingly stringent view 
of what was necessary to satisfy the due process clause of the federal Constitution.  The next 
cases in line are the related but opposite cases of Board of Regents v. Roth74 and Perry v. 
Sindermann.75 In Roth, the Supreme Court reversed a summary judgment decision from the 
Western District of Wisconsin, which ordered university officials to provide an untenured 
assistant professor with reasons for not rehiring him.  The district court also required that the 
university provide Roth with an opportunity to be heard.76 The Supreme Court noted that “the 
range of interests protected by procedural due process is not infinite,”77 and held that since “[t]he 
State, in declining to rehire the respondent, did not make any charge against him that might 
seriously damage his standing and associations in the community,” “did not base the nonrenewal 
of his contract on a charge, for example, that he had been guilty of dishonesty, or immorality,” 
and did not impose any stigma on him, his due process rights were not violated by a termination 
without opportunity to be heard.78 
In Perry, however, the Court reached the opposite result.  The facts are virtually the 
same, but with one distinguishing feature: the college’s perceived de facto tenure system.  While 
Roth was employed as an untenured professor for only one term, Sindermann had worked in the 
state college system for ten years, four as a junior college professor.79 Sindermann publicly 
criticized some of the college’s policies, and he specifically advocated changing the college from 
a two-year junior college to a four-year college, which the regents opposed.80 After these 
disagreements, the board of regents voted not to renew his contract, which had remained a one-
year contract that was continuously renewed.81 After voting not to renew, the board of regents 
 
72. See, e.g., Timothy Zick, Statehood as the New Personhood: The Discovery of Fundamental 
“States’ Rights,” 46 WM. & MARY L. REV. 213, 252 n.177 (2004). 
73. This statement is obviously not intended to denigrate the importance of Goldberg. Epstein put it 
nicely: “Although thundering greatness shall forever elude it, Goldberg nonetheless rates at the very top of the 
second tier of great Supreme Court cases, those which organize and structure a large portion of the ongoing dialogue 
within the legal system.”  Epstein, supra note 67, at 747. 
74. 408 U.S. 564 (1972). 
75. 408 U.S. 593 (1972). 
76. Roth, 408 U.S. at 569. 
77. Id. at 570. 
78. Id. at 573–75. 
79. Perry, 408 U.S. at 594–95. 
80. Id. at 595. 
81. Id. 
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issued a press release that set forth allegations of Sindermann’s perceived insubordination.82 He 
received no opportunity for a hearing to challenge the basis of the nonrenewal.83 The Court held 
that the lack of contractual tenure did not defeat Sindermann’s procedural due process claim; the 
college’s de facto tenure system created a sufficient interest.84 Thus, “‘property’ interests subject 
to procedural due process protection are not limited by a few rigid technical forms.  Rather, 
‘property’ denotes a broad range of interests that are secured by ‘existing rules or 
understandings.’”85 Thus, after Roth and Perry, the property focus shifted to whether rules or 
mutually explicit understandings supported entitlement claims.86 
But sometimes, mutually explicit understandings do not give rise to a constitutional 
procedural due process concern.  In Arnett v. Kennedy, a plurality of the Supreme Court held that 
an act that conferred to employees a right not to be discharged but for cause and detailing 
procedures did not create an expectancy of job retention that implicated procedural due process 
protection beyond that extended in the act.87 The conception of property coming out of Arnett 
was slightly different from those cases that had come before; the contours of the property right 
depended on the underlying law creating it.  That is, where the statute created the right asserted 
and provided limitations and procedures to the right, a claimant could not take advantage of the 
statute’s protection and simultaneously attack its procedural safeguards.  The property conferred 
by the statute was no broader than the text delineated.  It was in Arnett that then-Justice 
Rehnquist authored his often-cited conclusion that “where the grant of a substantive right is 
inextricably intertwined with the limitations on the procedures which are to be employed in 
determining that right, a litigant in the position of appellee must take the bitter with the sweet.”88 
The distinction among these cases is quite fine—some would argue imperceptible.  It 
becomes difficult at this point in the doctrine’s development to generalize what types of interests 
might be sufficient and how to understand the differences.  Arnett and Perry are particularly 
difficult to reconcile.  Here, then, it is important to note an assumption or at least an intricacy in 
this research: studying how courts use Supreme Court precedent assumes that the lower courts 
can extract the rules from the cases.  It is in eras when such a task is difficult or impossible that 
courts are starkly faced with the choice of how to use precedent. 
 The Court retreated from Arnett’s bitter-with-the-sweet principle about ten years later in 
Cleveland Board of Education v. Loudermill.89 The Loudermill Court held that although state 
law remains the primary focus for determining whether a property right exists, the procedures in 
the state law creating the property rights are not the source of the constitutionally required 
procedures.  Thus, even though state law plays a central role, federal constitutional law will 
decide the procedural due process query.90 
82. Id. 
83. Id. 
84. Id. at 600–01. 
85. Id. at 601 (citing Roth, 408 U.S. 564). 
86. Id. (citing Roth, 408 U.S. 564). 
87. 416 U.S. 134, 151–54 (1974). 
88. Id. at 153–54. 
89. 470 U.S. 532 (1985). 
90. Id. at 538–40. 
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2. SHIFT IN FOCUS FROM DEFINING THE RIGHT TO CONSIDERING THE PROCESS: MATHEWS 
Two years after Arnett, the Court decided Mathews v. Eldridge,91 which is generally 
considered as high profile and influential as Goldberg.92 Its holding, however, was quite 
different.  While Goldberg required pretermination hearings for welfare recipients, Mathews held 
that pretermination evidentiary hearings were not required for social security recipients.  The 
focus of the case was different; prior to Mathews, the Court was primarily concerned with 
defining what constituted liberty or property itself.  The secondary question, which is of equal 
importance, is what process is actually due. 
Mathews leads the inquiry that courts apply when a case involves a constitutionally 
protected interest.  In this case, no one disputed that termination of social security benefits was 
entitled to procedural due process.  The issue instead was whether the agency’s existing 
administrative procedures provided sufficient process before beneficiaries could be deprived of 
those benefits and what process is due prior to the initial termination of benefits.93 The Court 
explained that its procedural due process jurisprudence “underscore[s] the truism that” “‘due 
process is flexible and calls for such procedural protections as the particular situation 
demands.’”94 The Court also elucidated its test to apply in assessing whether the demands of 
procedural due process have been met.  Specifically, courts should consider three factors: (1) the 
private interest that will be affected by the official action; (2) the risk of an erroneous deprivation 
of such interest through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or 
substitute procedural safeguards; and (3) the government’s interest, including the function 
involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural 
requirement would entail.95 
The Court then proceeded to apply its factors, and concluded that only in Goldberg had a 
pretermination hearing been necessary.96 After pointing out that Goldberg was peculiar in its 
line of procedural due process, the Court concluded that the unique financial need is what drove 
the decision.97 Since the social security benefits in Mathews were unrelated to financial need, the 
administrative procedures in place, which did not include a pretermination hearing, were 
sufficient.98 The Mathews framework and its concomitant reasoning remain the relevant 
framework with which to approach procedural due process problems. 
 
91. 424 U.S. 319 (1976). 
92. For a discussion on Mathews, see Jerry L. Mashaw, The Supreme Court’s Due Process Calculus 
for Administrative Adjudication in Mathews v. Eldridge: Three Factors in Search of a Theory of Value, 44 U. CHI.
L. REV. 28 (1976). 
93. Mathews, 424 U.S. at 332–33. 
94. Id. at 334 (citing Cafeteria Workers v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886 (1961); Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 
U.S. 471 (1972)). 
95. Id. at 335. 
96. Id. at 340. 
97. Id. at 340–41 (“As Goldberg illustrates, the degree of potential deprivation that may be created by 
a particular decision is a factor to be considered in assessing the validity of any administrative decisionmaking 
process.”) 
98. Id. at 340. 
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3. POST-MATHEWS CONSIDERATION OF WHAT CONSTITUTES A LIBERTY OR PROPERTY INTEREST 
The procedural due process cases in the late 1970s and beyond typically divide the Court 
on whether the asserted interest is a protected liberty or property interest.  In Paul v. Davis,99 for 
example, a divided Court held that a plaintiff whom the local police identified as an “active 
shoplifter” did not have a sufficient liberty or property interest in his reputation alone.100 In 
seeking to define the contours of the right, the Court wrote: 
 
It is apparent from our decisions that there exists a variety of interests which are 
difficult of definition but are nevertheless comprehended within the meaning of 
either “liberty” or “property” as meant in the Due Process Clause.  These interests 
attain this constitutional status by virtue of the fact that they have been initially 
recognized and protected by state law, and we have repeatedly ruled that the 
procedural guarantees of the Fourteenth Amendment apply whenever the State 
seeks to remove or significantly alter that protected status.101 
When “a right or status previously recognized by state law was distinctly altered or 
extinguished,” this alteration of status was sufficient to implicate procedural due process 
concerns.102 A simple reputational interest, however, did not rise to that level.  The reputational 
interest is one of a number of interests that states may protect through tort law.103 “[A]ny harm 
or injury to that interest, even where as here inflicted by an officer of the State, does not result in 
a deprivation of any ‘liberty’ or ‘property.’”104 
DeShaney v. Winnebago County Social Services105 is an example of a procedural due 
process case that sharply divided the Supreme Court.  In this case, Joshua DeShaney sued the 
Winnebago County Department of Social Services for failing to protect him from severe abuse at 
the hands of his custodial father.  The department had received a number of complaints and took 
steps to protect Joshua but had failed to remove him from the home.  His father eventually beat 
him so severely he fell into a coma and became profoundly retarded.  The Court held that the 
Due Process Clause did not impose a special duty on the state where the state had not created the 
danger.  The dissenters believed that the state had indeed created the harm in that they failed to 
respond adequately to complaints.  A reasonable citizen would believe that she had done all she 
could to protect Joshua by reporting the abuse.  Thus, the state’s procedures eliminated any 
further chance of citizen intervention.  Its inadequate response ensured that Joshua would receive 
no help. 
Finally, the most significant recent case in the procedural due process right to hearing 
line of cases came in 1997, with Gilbert v. Homar.106 Gilbert involved a tenured public 
 
99. 424 U.S. 693 (1976). 
100. Id. at 694–95.  The police distributed to local merchants a flyer that identified the plaintiff and 
others as active shoplifter and included his much shot.  Id. at 694–95. 
101. Id. at 710–11. 
102. Id. at 711. 
103. Id. at 712. 
104. Id. 
105. DeShaney v. Winnebago County Social Servs., 489 U.S. 189 (1989). 
106. 520 U.S. 924 (1997). 
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employee who was suspended without pay after his arrest in a drug raid.107 The criminal charges 
against the complainant were eventually dismissed, but his suspension remained in effect.108 He 
was ultimately demoted from a university security officer to a groundskeeper.109 After receiving 
this notice, he challenged his suspension without pay, arguing that he should have been permitted 
to be heard before the suspension.110 
In its analysis, the Court assumed that the suspension was sufficient to implicate a 
property right.111 The Court then cited a string of cases establishing that procedural due process 
challenges must be considered in light of their circumstances.  In this case, the Court recognized 
that although the complainant did have an interest in his job and his compensation, his interests 
must be balanced against the state’s significant interest in immediately suspending employees 
who occupy positions of great public trust and high public visibility when felony charges are 
filed against them.112 Since the risk of erroneous deprivation was not great and the likelihood 
that additional procedures would be valuable was slim, the complainant’s procedural due process 
rights were not violated in this case.113 
D. Summarizing the Sketch of Supreme Court Procedural Due Process Precedent 
 
In sum, procedural due process law now first considers whether there is a liberty or 
property interest at stake.  Courts then apply the Mathews test to determine whether the 
procedures posed are adequate to meet the constitutional mandate.  The Court is, however, 
deferential to the government in circumstances where the state must act quickly or where 
imposing pretermination procedures would prove particularly onerous.  The analysis is 
importantly fact-centric; courts continuously adapt the test to apply to the circumstances they 
face. 
My study is divided into five time periods built around four signpost cases.  These cases, 
which generally represent a rule or policy change, include Goldberg (1970), Mathews (1976), 
DeShaney (1989), and Gilbert (1997).  Goldberg, as I explained above, was a watershed case in 
the field of procedural due process.  It reaffirmed the approach of courts that had been reading 
liberty and property broadly, and it directed those who had interpreted the terms more narrowly 
to adopt a more dynamic approach.  Goldberg is a strong signpost case simply because it 
represented a fundamental change in the law.  Mathews, on the other hand, makes a good 
signpost because it represents a retrenchment; it halts the potentially broad sweep of Goldberg.
The 1980s were a fairly quiet period of procedural due process law in the Supreme Court; most 
of the innovation took place in the lower federal courts.  I chose to use DeShaney as a Supreme 
Court signpost because it represented a good span of time after Mathews and because DeShaney 
was controversial.  Given the general lack of Supreme Court guidance on procedural due process 
in the 1980s and the general unpopularity of the DeShaney holding, I believed that it would be 
interesting to see how lower courts responded to an opinion with which they may have disagreed.  
 
107. Id. at 926–27. 
108. Id. at 927. 
109. Id. at 928. 
110. Id. 
111. Id. at 929. 
112. Id. at 932. 
113. Id. at 932–33. 
21 
Finally, Gilbert again represents another tightening of the procedural due process doctrine and 
provides a significant range of years to look at the development of the case law since its 
issuance. 
 
III. AN EMPIRICAL CONSIDERATION OF PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS IN THE LOWER FEDERAL 
COURTS 
A. Sampling Method 
 
In building my study, I sampled 252 cases from the federal district courts and the federal 
courts of appeals.  The sampling technique I used is probably closest to stratified random 
sampling.  In order to build my sample, I conducted simple terms searches for procedural due 
process cases involving benefits or hearings in the Westlaw database for cases in the relevant 
jurisdictions.  My criterion for cases chosen was only that they actually involve procedural due 
process.  That is, I did not read the cases prior to sampling and drop some on the basis that their 
treatment of the issues was somehow deficient.  The stratified aspect enters in that I attempted to 
choose an approximately equal number of cases decided in the relevant jurisdictions. 
My sample includes 152 cases from the courts of appeals.  Since there are twelve circuits 
including the District of Columbia Circuit but excluding the Federal Circuit,114 I sampled 
between twelve and twenty cases from each circuit depending on the applicability and relevance 
of the cases in those circuits.  I excluded the Federal Circuit because it is a court of special 
jurisdiction, and I hypothesized that the special rules and case load could skew the data. 
I also sampled 100 federal district court cases.  My initial goal was to obtain an even 
geographic spread across the jurisdictions.  This strategy, however, proved untenable.  Certain 
jurisdictions adjudicated far more right-to-hearing and benefit-type cases than did other 
jurisdictions.  This phenomenon likely results from forum selection and the demographics of the 
citizenry.  Thus, instead of focusing on geography, which is interesting from a socio-legal 
standpoint, I focused instead on cases with the most useful substantive legal issue.  The district 
court cases, then, are closer to a random draw from the relevant databases instead of a stratified 
random sample. 
In order to code the cases, I used fourteen variables that appeared frequently in the 
Supreme Court signpost opinions.  As I described above, the signpost cases I chose were 
Goldberg (1970); Mathews (1976); DeShaney (1989); and Gilbert (1997).  I divided the data into 
five subsets, one for each of the periods between the signpost cases, one small subset for 
“prehistorical” purposes, and one modern trends subset that suggest where the courts are heading 
with these issues.  The pre-1970 sample contains only a few iterations, so any statistics on it are 
suspect.  But the utility of that subset lies not in any rigorous statistical analysis.  Instead, the 
point of the data is to set the stage for the major signpost periods. 
In approaching the variable formulation, I was particularly interested in ascertaining what 
patterns of decisions and combinations of variables emerged in the lower court cases.  I wanted 
to understand whether the lower courts defer readily to Supreme Court precedent or whether they 
 
114. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit is a national court of limited jurisdiction.  The 
Federal Circuit hears disputes regarding international trade, government contracts, patents, trademarks, certain 
money claims against the United States government, federal personnel, and veterans’ benefits.  Although some of 
those cases may involve procedural due process, sampling cases from the court would introduce bias given its 
specialized nature. 
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attempt to distinguish precedent.  I wanted to know whether the lower courts function as doctrine 
innovators that may or may not drive Supreme Court precedent.115 Similarly, I wanted to know 
whether the district courts were any less willing to defer to doctrine innovations by the court of 
appeals that were not grounded in a Supreme Court opinion.  Finally, I considered whether 
courts were more likely to defer to the government in cases where the due process issue was one 
of the adequacy of existing procedures as opposed to the existence of a liberty or property 
interest itself. 
The variables, which are all coded as binary variables, include the dependent variable of 
whether there was a procedural due process violation,116 and independent variables for whether 
the case was a district court or court of appeals opinion, 117 the year of decision,118 presence or 
absence of a wealth indicator,119 whether the government or entity used officially documented 
procedures,120 whether the court included language regarding feasibility of alternative 
procedures,121 whether the court included language regarding hardship on the plaintiff,122 whether 
the case involved some type of “wrongful” act by the plaintiff that might terminate benefits,123 
whether the case involved a liberty or property interest that was clearly delineated by the U.S. 
Supreme Court,124 whether the case involved a liberty or property interest that was clearly 
delineated by the U.S. Court of Appeals,125 and whether the case involved an interest the court 
considered extremely important but was not previously defined as such by a court with binding 
authority. 126 
I also included variables as to whether the disposition included a concurring or dissenting 
opinion.  This variable was far less prevalent in the district courts, as a single judge presides over 
the vast majority of district court cases.  A handful, however, were heard by the three-judge 
panels. 
The final variables that the models include are time variables.  I broke the cases into five 
separate time periods to study the effects of the signpost cases.  The first time period is pre-
Goldberg;127 the second is Goldberg to Mathews,128 the third is Mathews to DeShaney,129 the 
fourth is DeShaney to Gilbert,130 and the final timeframe is Gilbert and beyond.131 
115. See KLEIN, supra note 3, at 107–30 (discussing anticipation of Supreme Court decisions). 
116. Pdpviolation, coded 1-0. 
117. DistCt, coded 1 if the case was a district court opinion, 0 if the case was a court of appeals 
opinion. 
118. Year, coded by year 
119. Wealthindic, coded 1-0 
120. officialprocedures, coded 1-0 
121. altfeasibility, coded 1-0 
122. hardship, coded 1-0 
123. wrongact, coded 1-0 
124. sctclearlibpropinterest, coded 1-0 
125. ctaclearlibpropinterest, coded 1-0 
126. eximportant, coded 1-0 
127. time0, coded 1-0 (pre-1970) 
128. time1, coded 1-0 (1970-1975) 
129. time2, coded 1-0 (1976-1988) 
130. time3, coded 1-0 (1989-1996) 
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B. Statistical Approach 
After building the dataset, I estimated twenty-five models using the logit method.132 It is 
helpful to think of the models in five sets, as the five sets themselves contain a different 
combination of variables, and the models within those sets estimate the effects of the signpost 
cases. 
Set one of these models predicts whether the case contained a procedural due process 
violation throughout the signpost periods depending on whether the deciding court was a district 
or circuit court, whether the opinions contained concurrences or dissents, whether the case 
involved the presence of a wealth indicator, whether the case contained language regarding 
hardship on the plaintiff, whether the government used official procedures in reaching its 
decision, whether the case contained language regarding the feasibility of using alternative 
procedures, whether the case involved some type of wrong act by the plaintiff, and whether the 
case involved a liberty or property interest that the Supreme Court had clearly defined in the 
past. 
 Set two of these models predicts whether the case contained a procedural due process 
violation throughout the signpost periods using the same variables above except it replaces the 
Supreme Court liberty or property interest with cases where a U.S. court of appeals had clearly 
defined in the past. 
Set three involves cases where neither the Supreme Court or a U.S. court of appeals has 
defined the interest in question as a liberty or property interest but the opinion identifies the 
interest at stake as some other extremely important interest.  Set four predicts whether the case 
contained a procedural due process violation throughout the signpost periods depending on the 
previously described variables but combines cases where the Supreme Court has clearly defined 
a liberty or property interest and the case contains language regarding some other extremely 
important interest.  Set five predicts violations in cases where a U.S. court of appeals has clearly 
defined the liberty or property interest and there is language regarding some other extremely 
important interest. 
Each of these sets then runs iterations of the model against the time variables.  The five 
iterations per set allowed me to drop a timeframe variable so that I could compare the activity of 
the courts to that dropped timeframe.  That is, in the first iteration of set one, I dropped the pre-
1970 timeframe variable.  Thus, the results of that iteration compare to the pre-1970 likelihood 
of procedural due process violations. 
 
131. time4, coded 1-0 (1997 and beyond) 
132. I used Stata 7 to conduct my estimations.  Stata’s logit function, which I used, reports results in 
coefficient metrics.  The logistic function, which I did not use, reports in odds ratios.  The statistical output is 
available infra at Appendix A.  My research plan, as I explain, used five iterations per model.  This approach is not 
strictly necessary; it is quite possible to employ only one model and interpret the numbers against one dropped 
variable.  I elected, however, to use multiple iterations in order to make the effect of the timeframe variables more 
explicit.  While the iterations contain some redundancy, they should contain no bias.  For an explanation of the 
theoretical principles behind these models, see, for example, Peter Kennedy, A Guide to Econometrics 233–34 (4th 
ed. 2001) (discussing dichotomous dependent variables), and Michael O. Finkelstein & Bruce Levin, Statistics for 
Lawyers 257–74 (providing an overview of sampling) & 458–72 (discussing logit and probit regression models). 
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C. The Results 
1. SET ONE 
In the first set of models—where the model examines whether the cases involve a 
procedural due process violation depending on whether the opinion comes from a district court, 
has a concurrence or dissent, involves wealth indicators, includes language involving hardship or 
alternative feasibility, whether the government used official procedures, whether the plaintiff 
committed a wrong act, and when the Supreme Court has held that the interest in question is a 
constitutionally protected liberty or property interest—the timeframe variable does not strongly 
affect whether there is a procedural due process violation.  Compared to the pre-1970 cases, the 
timeframe variable has no statistically significant effect on whether the case results in a 
procedural due process violation.  That is, cases pre-1970 are about as likely to involve 
procedural due process violations as those cases post-1970.  Variables that are statistically 
significant include the existence of a dissent, language regarding hardship on the plaintiff, 
discussion of alternative feasibility, and whether there is a Supreme Court liberty or property 
interest.  In the pre-1970 cases, the presence of a dissent made it more likely that the case had 
been adjudicated to find a procedural due process violation.  Language regarding the hardship on 
the defendant and the presence of a clearly articulated liberty or property interest by the Supreme 
Court also increase the chances of a procedural due process violation in the pre-1970 period. 
 In general, the direction of the effect of these variables makes sense.  It is logical that if a 
court took the time to discuss hardship on the plaintiff, then the judges displayed some type of 
sympathy toward the plaintiff that would likely result in finding a violation.  Likewise, the 
alternative feasibility variable is sensible as well; it is a reasonable argument that if the court 
took time to include language on alternative feasibility, it is probable that the court believed 
other measures would have imposed a great burden on the government.  Thus, the direction of 
that variable makes sense. 
 In cases where the Supreme Court decided that the interest in question was a 
constitutionally protected liberty or property interest, the likelihood of a procedural due process 
violation increased.  This finding suggests that judges are acting judicially—that they are 
following the precedent of the reviewing courts. 
 In the second iteration, the time variables are significant.  As in the pre-1970 period, the 
presence of a dissent, language regarding hardship on the plaintiff, and the presence of a clearly 
defined liberty or property interest by the Supreme Court all increase the likelihood of an 
adjudication of a procedural due process violation while language about the alternative feasibility 
for the government decreases the likelihood.  Compared to the 1970 to 1975 period, however, 
procedural due process violations were less likely to occur during 1976 to 1989 and 1997 to 
present. 
These results are sensible.  The 1970 to 1975 period is the immediate aftermath of 
Goldberg; it is sensible that courts were more willing to read the doctrine broadly as they defined 
the boundaries of the case.  Mathews, on the other hand, was sharply restrictive; it is sensible that 
immediately after that opinion, the lower courts interpreted the Supreme Court to be reining in 
the doctrine.  During the 1980s, the Supreme Court allowed the lower courts more freedom with 
regard to procedural due process, and it seems sensible that those courts were more willing to 
return to a broader interpretation.  Finally, Gilbert is another restrictive opinion, so a restrictive 
reaction is expected. 
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 It is interesting that neither wealth indicators of wrong acts of the plaintiff show up as 
statistically significant.  Much of Goldberg’s rhetoric centered on the idea of the extreme need of 
welfare beneficiaries, that the government could not deprive beneficiaries of the very means by 
which they live while it sorted out its administrative issues.  Given the strength of that rhetoric, I 
expected the presence of a wealth indicator to affect whether a judge found a procedural due 
process violation.  The same is true of the wrong act variable. 
 The third, fourth, and fifth iterations of the first set provide the inverse of what I have 
already described.  The bottom line is that courts were most likely to find procedural due process 
violations during the time period between Goldberg and Mathews, which is what one would 
expect in the abstract. 
 
2. SET TWO 
Set two, which contains the same variables as set one except that the clear liberty or 
property interest defined by the Supreme Court has been replaced with a clear liberty or property 
interest defined by a court of appeals, contains similar results.  This set of estimations does, 
however, contain some very important differences. 
 First, unlike the Supreme Court variable, the court of appeals variable does not 
significantly affect whether a court is likely to find a procedural due process violation.  One 
would expect that the likelihood of procedural due process violations to increase if a court of 
appeals has determined that the liberty or property interest at stake is constitutionally significant.  
The variable, however, is not statistically significant, which suggests that perhaps other courts do 
not imbue nonbinding precedent with all that much persuasive authority.  This finding also 
suggests that the innovative power of the lower courts might be rather low. 
Second, the presence of a wealth indicator and the presence of official procedures are 
statistically significant variables.  In these cases, the presence of a wealth indicator increases the 
likelihood that the court will find a procedural due process violation.  One possible reason to 
explain why the wealth indicator might be significant here but not in situations where the 
Supreme Court has spoken to the liberty or property interest issue might be the idea of 
innovation.  When the Supreme Court has not spoken on a liberty or property issue—or if it has 
decided that there is no liberty or property interest at stake (which my variables contemplate)—
the lower courts might be more affected by a wealth indicator.  Abject poverty might inspire 
sympathy that leads the court to be more solicitous of the procedural due process issue. 
The official procedures variable, however, is more difficult to explain.  The data suggest 
that where courts recognize that the government has used official procedures, the more likely 
they are to find a procedural due process violation.  In the abstract, I would expect that a court 
might be more deferential to the government when it has official procedures in place.  It is again 
possible, however, that the courts discuss the official procedures only when they are insufficient.  
This discussion would explain why presence of the language suggests an increased likelihood of 
finding a violation. 
 The timeframe variables have roughly the same effect in set two as they do in set one.  
Most procedural due process violations occur during the years between 1970 and 1975 and again 
between 1989 through 1997.  The 1989 through 1997 timeframe did not show up as statistically 
significant in set one.  This result suggests that the lower courts were more likely to find 
procedural due process violations when the Supreme Court had not spoken on the interest at 
stake in the aftermath of DeShaney.
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3. SET THREE 
In some cases, judges recognized that no court had described the interest at stake as a 
constitutionally protected liberty or property interest but still believed that the interest was 
significant.  These judges sometimes attempted to bring the interest under the rubric of the 
constitutionally protected interests, but in other cases simply discussed the centrality of the issue.  
The estimations in set three attempt to understand the significance of these extremely important 
interests to judges. 
 These models also may reveal something about how the lower courts function as policy 
innovators.  In most of these cases, the interest has not yet been recognized as constitutionally 
significant.  The judicial action in these cases, however, might be the first step toward 
constitutionalizing the interest. 
 The results of these estimations are largely the same as the models in set two.  Again, the 
statistically significant variables include the presence of a dissent, wealth indicators, language 
regarding hardship, language regarding official procedures, and language regarding feasibility of 
alternative measures.  The presence of each variable but the alternative feasibility measures 
makes it more likely that there will be a procedural due process violations.  The alternative 
feasibility variable again makes it less likely that there will be a violation. 
 The extremely important interest variable also significantly affects whether the court will 
find a procedural due process violation.  This result is to be expected; if a court is taking time to 
identify an extremely important interest, then the court likely thinks that interest is important 
enough to justify requiring more on the pretermination end.  If the court does not find the interest 
asserted compelling, then it is more likely that they will simply dismiss it out of hand. 
Importantly, the district court variable is significant.  If the case is heard in the district 
court, it is more likely to result in a finding of a procedural due process violation over all the 
relevant timeframes.  Thus, it appears that the district courts are either more solicitous of 
plaintiffs in procedural due process suits than are the appellate courts or that the district courts 
are more innovative in finding procedural due process violations in cases where the interest 
involved is not a constitutionally protected liberty or property interest.  That can be phrased 
differently, of course; it is possible that the courts of appeals adhere more strictly to established 
precedent than do the district courts in cases that might forge new ground in procedural due 
process law.  This result may make good sense; the precedential sweep of an appellate opinion is 
much broader than a district court opinion.  The place for innovation and testing of these new 
interests may properly be the district courts where erroneous findings can be dislodged more 
easily and ignored by other courts if prudent. 
The timeframe variables again display a similar pattern.  Cases decided between 1976 
and 1989 and after 1997 are less likely to result in findings of procedural due process violations 
than are cases decided between 1970 and 1975.  Cases decided between 1989 and 1996 are more 
likely to result in violations than are cases decided between 1975 and 1988.  Thus, the lower 
courts seem to be following the guidance set forth in the Supreme Court signposts. 
 
4. SETS FOUR AND FIVE 
The estimations in sets four and five attempt to understand a pattern that I noticed in 
coding cases.  Sometimes the judges decided a case based on a clear liberty or property interest 
as defined by either the Supreme Court or a court of appeals, but the judges still include language 
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about extremely important interests at stake for the plaintiff.  The extremely important interest is 
in some cases directly related to the already protected interest.  In others, however, the extremely 
important interest is cumulative; not only do the litigants have some protected property right, 
some other issue is implicated. 
 To pick up this effect, I estimated models with combined liberty or property interests and 
extremely important interests.  The results of these models are very similar to the results in sets 
one and two respectively.  The statistically significant variables are the same, with the exception 
of the timeframe variables and the addition of the extremely important interest variable, which is 
statistically significant in both sets.  That is, the combination of a Supreme Court-defined liberty 
or property interest and some other extremely important interest results in a greater likelihood of 
finding a procedural due process violation for both variables.  The combination of a court of 
appeals-defined liberty or property interest and some other extremely important interest results in 
a greater likelihood of finding a procedural due process violation, but only for the extremely 
important interest variable.  Thus, we again see a situation where an interest recognized by the 
court of appeals does not significantly affect whether another court will find that interest 
constitutionally significant enough to result in a procedural due process violation. 
 When the judicially defined liberty or property interest variable is combined with the 
extremely important interest variable, it affects the significance of the timeframe variables in set 
four.  Whereas in set one, the period between 1976 and 1989 had fewer violations than 1970 to 
1975, this result is no longer significant.  The years after Gilbert (post-1997) still have fewer 
violations than the years between Goldberg and Mathews. However, when the 1970 to 1975 
timeframe is compared to the other variables, procedural due process violations are significantly 
more likely during that timeframe.  Set five’s timeframe variables are identical to their set three 
counterparts. 
 
5. OTHER TRENDS 
In no model did the wrong act variable show up as statistically significant.  This result is 
not necessarily what I expected, given the Court’s focus on the importance of allowing oral 
hearings in certain termination cases.  Language in Goldberg and Mathews in particular 
discussed that where issues of reputation might influence outcome, the target was entitled to 
explain her side in person.  But the variable could cut the other way as well.  If a court perceives 
the plaintiff as an outlaw or engaged in some other type of bad behavior, then the court might be 
less sympathetic to the procedural due process claims.  Thus, the effects might cancel each other 
out, which would explain the statistical insignificance of the variable. 
 The timeframe variables suggest that the lower courts seem to respond to the Supreme 
Court signpost cases.  When the Supreme Court expanded procedural due process in Goldberg,
the lower courts responded by more readily finding procedural due process violations.  When the 
Court restricted the doctrine in Mathews, the lower courts found violations in fewer cases than 
they had in the past.  When the Court remained silent on procedural due process issues for quite 
some time and issued only a relatively unpopular case, the lower courts developed and expanded 
the doctrine until the Court again restricted things in Gilbert. Thus, my data suggest that the 
lower courts act judicially and are responsive to the guidance set forth by the Supreme Court.  
They certainly are willing to innovate, but they tend to do so within the clearly established 
bounds of the reviewing courts. 
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D.  Summary and Situating the Results in the Scholarship 
 
The broadest conclusion to draw from this research is that, in general, courts act as a 
precedent-model adherent would expect.  Courts are more likely to find that a procedural due 
process violation occurred where the Supreme Court has said that the liberty or property interest 
at stake is protected.  The presence of a dissent is also important, suggesting that the lower courts 
respond more innovatively to mixed precedent.  That is, when the signals are unclear, the lower 
courts take a more active role in shaping the doctrine.  The other important factors include 
wealth indicators, language regarding hardship, language regarding official procedures, and 
language regarding feasibility of alternative measures.  These factors are in line with Supreme 
Court precedent, suggesting that the lower courts are using the relevant tests—or at least paying 
homage to them in their opinions. 
 This remark raises an important point.  The numbers do suggest that the courts are 
engaged in precedential reasoning, since the language of the opinions tracks the language of the 
relevant precedent.  It is possible, of course, that the courts engaged in this type of reasoning to 
mask their true intent to advance their policy preferences.  But the timeframe variables add an 
important contour to this point: the courts were more likely to find procedural due process 
violations in the post-Goldberg, pre-Mathews era.  That is, the courts responded to Supreme 
Court precedent, both when it suggested the need for broad interpretation and when it reined in 
the boundaries.  Thus, at least in the realm of procedural due process, the naked attitudinal model 
fails to tell the entire story. 
 But neither do the courts appear to adhere to a pure precedential model.  If the courts did 
behave in this fashion, one would expect precedent from the courts of appeals to have a 
statistically significant impact.  The fact that it does not indicates that the courts are disagreeing 
with one another and engaging in a dialogue about what the law is.  This dialogue necessarily 
involves some predictions about how the Supreme Court would move the doctrine given the 
chance. 
 Moreover, the data—and the nature of the opinions themselves—suggest that there is 
some objective notion as to what constitutes “good” legal reasoning.  The opinions quite 
consistently engage in the same type of reasoning, regardless of the results reached.  That is, the 
opinions invoke and explain the relevant tests and usually try to fit the facts to the test or find 
distinctions to justify a departure.  Fear of reversal might play a role, as an opinion flagrantly 
disregarding the rules is begging to be overturned.  But more that that seems to be at play.  
Judges rarely criticize the existing law; instead, they write and apply it as though it is objectively 
correct.  Precedent is critical, because it is law.  This conclusion too suggests the precedent 
model is at least the fundamental model at work in the system. 
 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Thus, my data suggest that the precedent model is the model that the lower federal courts 
apply most often.  While some evidence suggests that the district courts are willing to act as 
policy innovators, most estimations indicate that the lower courts respond to guidance and trends 
from the Supreme Court.  My research suggests that in the realm of procedural due process, 
courts do not flout precedent, even if they disagree with it. 
 This finding does not mean the lower courts blindly follow precedent, only that they 
proceed rather cautiously in making new law.  The conclusion that judges act judicially is not 
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monumental in the abstract.  But in the contemporary political climate, which commonly assails 
judges for being activist and ignoring majority will, the conclusion is somewhat surprising. 
 This research is only the first step to a broader consideration of policymaking in the 
federal courts.  My research has examined the relatively straightforward issues involved in 
procedural due process.  New questions surround policymaking activity in more substantively 
complex areas of law and those more politically charged.  Studying those areas in depth will 
provide a more complete picture of how the lower federal courts conceptualize their policy role 
and engage in the lawmaking enterprise. 
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APPENDIX A: STATISTICAL OUTPUT†
. sort year_dummy 
 
. summarize year_dummy 
 
Variable |     Obs        Mean   Std. Dev.       Min        Max 
-------------+----------------------------------------------------- 





. logit  pdpviolation time1 time2 time3 time4 distct  concurrence dissent wealth 
> indic hardship officialprocedures altfeasibility wrongact sctclearlibpropinter 
> est 
 
Iteration 0:   log likelihood = -169.03059 
Iteration 1:   log likelihood = -116.36278 
Iteration 2:   log likelihood =  -110.9378 
Iteration 3:   log likelihood = -110.40469 
Iteration 4:   log likelihood = -110.39486 
Iteration 5:   log likelihood = -110.39485 
 
Logit estimates                                   Number of obs   =        250 
 LR chi2(13)     =     117.27 
 Prob > chi2     =     0.0000 
Log likelihood = -110.39485                       Pseudo R2       =     0.3469 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
pdpviolation |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
 time1 |   1.334633    1.23881     1.08   0.281    -1.093389    3.762656 
 time2 |   .1127769   1.204758     0.09   0.925    -2.248505    2.474059 
 time3 |   .5380236   1.220381     0.44   0.659    -1.853879    2.929926 
 time4 |  -.1440759   1.192928    -0.12   0.904    -2.482172     2.19402 
 distct |  -.1349282   .3994376    -0.34   0.736    -.9178116    .6479552 
 concurrence |  -.5177296   .7365692    -0.70   0.482    -1.961379    .9259194 
 dissent |    2.08967   .9218529     2.27   0.023      .282871    3.896468 
 wealthindic |   .0577264   .3807509     0.15   0.879    -.6885316    .8039844 
 hardship |   2.054924   .4837297     4.25   0.000     1.106831    3.003017 
officialpr~s |  -.1250649   .5138251    -0.24   0.808    -1.132144    .8820139 
altfeasibi~y |  -1.641658    .541169    -3.03   0.002     -2.70233    -.580986 
 wrongact |   .2747244    .354431     0.78   0.438    -.4199476    .9693964 
sctclearli~t |   3.154515    .540912     5.83   0.000     2.094346    4.214683 
 _cons |  -3.264901   1.344072    -2.43   0.015    -5.899234   -.6305682 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
† Output from Stata 7.  Statistically significant variables are denoted with boldface. 
A-2 
Iteration Two: 
. logit  pdpviolation time0 time2 time3 time4 distct  concurrence dissent wealth 
> indic hardship officialprocedures altfeasibility wrongact sctclearlibpropinter 
> est 
 
Iteration 0:   log likelihood = -169.03059 
Iteration 1:   log likelihood = -116.36278 
Iteration 2:   log likelihood =  -110.9378 
Iteration 3:   log likelihood = -110.40469 
Iteration 4:   log likelihood = -110.39486 
Iteration 5:   log likelihood = -110.39485 
 
Logit estimates                                   Number of obs   =        250 
 LR chi2(13)     =     117.27 
 Prob > chi2     =     0.0000 
Log likelihood = -110.39485                       Pseudo R2       =     0.3469 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
pdpviolation |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
 time0 |  -1.334633    1.23881    -1.08   0.281    -3.762656    1.093389 
 time2 |  -1.221856   .5584027    -2.19   0.029    -2.316306   -.1274072 
 time3 |  -.7966097   .5936409    -1.34   0.180    -1.960125     .366905 
 time4 |  -1.478709   .5486496    -2.70   0.007    -2.554043   -.4033758 
 distct |  -.1349282   .3994376    -0.34   0.736    -.9178116    .6479552 
 concurrence |  -.5177296   .7365692    -0.70   0.482    -1.961379    .9259194 
 dissent |    2.08967   .9218529     2.27   0.023      .282871    3.896468 
 wealthindic |   .0577264   .3807509     0.15   0.879    -.6885316    .8039844 
 hardship |   2.054924   .4837297     4.25   0.000     1.106831    3.003017 
officialpr~s |  -.1250649   .5138251    -0.24   0.808    -1.132144    .8820139 
altfeasibi~y |  -1.641658    .541169    -3.03   0.002     -2.70233    -.580986 
 wrongact |   .2747244    .354431     0.78   0.438    -.4199476    .9693964 
sctclearli~t |   3.154515    .540912     5.83   0.000     2.094346    4.214683 





. logit  pdpviolation time0 time1 time3 time4 distct  concurrence dissent wealth 
> indic hardship officialprocedures altfeasibility wrongact sctclearlibpropinter 
> est 
 
Iteration 0:   log likelihood = -169.03059 
Iteration 1:   log likelihood = -116.36278 
Iteration 2:   log likelihood =  -110.9378 
Iteration 3:   log likelihood = -110.40469 
Iteration 4:   log likelihood = -110.39486 
Iteration 5:   log likelihood = -110.39485 
 
Logit estimates                                   Number of obs   =        250 
 LR chi2(13)     =     117.27 
 Prob > chi2     =     0.0000 
Log likelihood = -110.39485                       Pseudo R2       =     0.3469 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
pdpviolation |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
 time0 |  -.1127769   1.204758    -0.09   0.925    -2.474059    2.248505 
 time1 |   1.221856   .5584027     2.19   0.029     .1274072    2.316306 
 time3 |   .4252467   .5074594     0.84   0.402    -.5693555    1.419849 
 time4 |  -.2568528   .4359131    -0.59   0.556    -1.111227    .5975211 
 distct |  -.1349282   .3994376    -0.34   0.736    -.9178116    .6479552 
 concurrence |  -.5177296   .7365692    -0.70   0.482    -1.961379    .9259194 
 dissent |    2.08967   .9218529     2.27   0.023      .282871    3.896468 
 wealthindic |   .0577264   .3807509     0.15   0.879    -.6885316    .8039844 
 hardship |   2.054924   .4837297     4.25   0.000     1.106831    3.003017 
officialpr~s |  -.1250649   .5138251    -0.24   0.808    -1.132144    .8820139 
altfeasibi~y |  -1.641658    .541169    -3.03   0.002     -2.70233    -.580986 
 wrongact |   .2747244    .354431     0.78   0.438    -.4199476    .9693964 
sctclearli~t |   3.154515    .540912     5.83   0.000     2.094346    4.214683 





. logit  pdpviolation time0 time1 time3 time4 distct  concurrence dissent wealth 
> indic hardship officialprocedures altfeasibility wrongact sctclearlibpropinter 
> est 
 
Iteration 0:   log likelihood = -169.03059 
Iteration 1:   log likelihood = -116.36278 
Iteration 2:   log likelihood =  -110.9378 
Iteration 3:   log likelihood = -110.40469 
Iteration 4:   log likelihood = -110.39486 
Iteration 5:   log likelihood = -110.39485 
 
Logit estimates                                   Number of obs   =        250 
 LR chi2(13)     =     117.27 
 Prob > chi2     =     0.0000 
Log likelihood = -110.39485                       Pseudo R2       =     0.3469 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
pdpviolation |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
 time0 |  -.1127769   1.204758    -0.09   0.925    -2.474059    2.248505 
 time1 |   1.221856   .5584027     2.19   0.029     .1274072    2.316306 
 time3 |   .4252467   .5074594     0.84   0.402    -.5693555    1.419849 
 time4 |  -.2568528   .4359131    -0.59   0.556    -1.111227    .5975211 
 distct |  -.1349282   .3994376    -0.34   0.736    -.9178116    .6479552 
 concurrence |  -.5177296   .7365692    -0.70   0.482    -1.961379    .9259194 
 dissent |    2.08967   .9218529     2.27   0.023      .282871    3.896468 
 wealthindic |   .0577264   .3807509     0.15   0.879    -.6885316    .8039844 
 hardship |   2.054924   .4837297     4.25   0.000     1.106831    3.003017 
officialpr~s |  -.1250649   .5138251    -0.24   0.808    -1.132144    .8820139 
altfeasibi~y |  -1.641658    .541169    -3.03   0.002     -2.70233    -.580986 
 wrongact |   .2747244    .354431     0.78   0.438    -.4199476    .9693964 
sctclearli~t |   3.154515    .540912     5.83   0.000     2.094346    4.214683 





. logit  pdpviolation time0 time1 time2 time3 distct  concurrence dissent wealth 
> indic hardship officialprocedures altfeasibility wrongact sctclearlibpropinter 
> est 
 
Iteration 0:   log likelihood = -169.03059 
Iteration 1:   log likelihood = -116.36278 
Iteration 2:   log likelihood =  -110.9378 
Iteration 3:   log likelihood = -110.40469 
Iteration 4:   log likelihood = -110.39486 
Iteration 5:   log likelihood = -110.39485 
 
Logit estimates                                   Number of obs   =        250 
 LR chi2(13)     =     117.27 
 Prob > chi2     =     0.0000 
Log likelihood = -110.39485                       Pseudo R2       =     0.3469 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
pdpviolation |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
 time0 |   .1440759   1.192928     0.12   0.904     -2.19402    2.482172 
 time1 |   1.478709   .5486496     2.70   0.007     .4033758    2.554043 
 time2 |   .2568528   .4359131     0.59   0.556    -.5975211    1.111227 
 time3 |   .6820995    .487403     1.40   0.162    -.2731929    1.637392 
 distct |  -.1349282   .3994376    -0.34   0.736    -.9178116    .6479552 
 concurrence |  -.5177296   .7365692    -0.70   0.482    -1.961379    .9259194 
 dissent |    2.08967   .9218529     2.27   0.023      .282871    3.896468 
 wealthindic |   .0577264   .3807509     0.15   0.879    -.6885316    .8039844 
 hardship |   2.054924   .4837297     4.25   0.000     1.106831    3.003017 
officialpr~s |  -.1250649   .5138251    -0.24   0.808    -1.132144    .8820139 
altfeasibi~y |  -1.641658    .541169    -3.03   0.002     -2.70233    -.580986 
 wrongact |   .2747244    .354431     0.78   0.438    -.4199476    .9693964 
sctclearli~t |   3.154515    .540912     5.83   0.000     2.094346    4.214683 








. logit  pdpviolation time1 time2 time3 time4 distct  concurrence dissent wealth 
> indic hardship officialprocedures altfeasibility wrongact ctaclearlibpropinter 
> est 
 
Iteration 0:   log likelihood = -169.03059 
Iteration 1:   log likelihood = -136.57547 
Iteration 2:   log likelihood =  -135.4814 
Iteration 3:   log likelihood =  -135.4686 
Iteration 4:   log likelihood =  -135.4686 
 
Logit estimates                                   Number of obs   =        250 
 LR chi2(13)     =      67.12 
 Prob > chi2     =     0.0000 
Log likelihood =  -135.4686                       Pseudo R2       =     0.1986 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
pdpviolation |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
 time1 |   1.188452   1.205485     0.99   0.324    -1.174256     3.55116 
 time2 |   .0356656   1.185949     0.03   0.976    -2.288753    2.360084 
 time3 |   .9529942   1.200618     0.79   0.427    -1.400174    3.306163 
 time4 |  -.0336961   1.173777    -0.03   0.977    -2.334257    2.266865 
 distct |   .6882161   .3453598     1.99   0.046     .0113233    1.365109 
 concurrence |  -.0820492   .6647698    -0.12   0.902    -1.384974    1.220876 
 dissent |   1.554792   .7841484     1.98   0.047     .0178893    3.091694 
 wealthindic |   .5795827   .3388218     1.71   0.087    -.0844958    1.243661 
 hardship |   1.760441   .4157874     4.23   0.000     .9455129     2.57537 
officialpr~s |   .8177788   .4088889     2.00   0.045     .0163713    1.619186 
altfeasibi~y |  -.9188401   .4694298    -1.96   0.050    -1.838906    .0012254 
 wrongact |   .4402515   .3195875     1.38   0.168    -.1861284    1.066631 
ctaclearli~t |   .7802598   1.387583     0.56   0.574    -1.939353    3.499872 





. logit  pdpviolation time0 time2 time3 time4 distct  concurrence dissent wealth 
> indic hardship officialprocedures altfeasibility wrongact ctaclearlibpropinter 
> est 
 
Iteration 0:   log likelihood = -169.03059 
Iteration 1:   log likelihood = -136.57547 
Iteration 2:   log likelihood =  -135.4814 
Iteration 3:   log likelihood =  -135.4686 
Iteration 4:   log likelihood =  -135.4686 
 
Logit estimates                                   Number of obs   =        250 
 LR chi2(13)     =      67.12 
 Prob > chi2     =     0.0000 
Log likelihood =  -135.4686                       Pseudo R2       =     0.1986 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
pdpviolation |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
 time0 |  -1.188452   1.205485    -0.99   0.324     -3.55116    1.174256 
 time2 |  -1.152786   .4726881    -2.44   0.015    -2.079238   -.2263348 
 time3 |  -.2354578   .5057791    -0.47   0.642    -1.226767     .755851 
 time4 |  -1.222148   .4599841    -2.66   0.008      -2.1237   -.3205957 
 distct |   .6882161   .3453598     1.99   0.046     .0113233    1.365109 
 concurrence |  -.0820492   .6647698    -0.12   0.902    -1.384974    1.220876 
 dissent |   1.554792   .7841484     1.98   0.047     .0178893    3.091694 
 wealthindic |   .5795827   .3388218     1.71   0.087    -.0844958    1.243661 
 hardship |   1.760441   .4157874     4.23   0.000     .9455129     2.57537 
officialpr~s |   .8177788   .4088889     2.00   0.045     .0163713    1.619186 
altfeasibi~y |  -.9188401   .4694298    -1.96   0.050    -1.838906    .0012254 
 wrongact |   .4402515   .3195875     1.38   0.168    -.1861284    1.066631 
ctaclearli~t |   .7802598   1.387583     0.56   0.574    -1.939353    3.499872 





. logit  pdpviolation time0 time1 time3 time4 distct  concurrence dissent wealth 
> indic hardship officialprocedures altfeasibility wrongact ctaclearlibpropinter 
> est 
 
Iteration 0:   log likelihood = -169.03059 
Iteration 1:   log likelihood = -136.57547 
Iteration 2:   log likelihood =  -135.4814 
Iteration 3:   log likelihood =  -135.4686 
Iteration 4:   log likelihood =  -135.4686 
 
Logit estimates                                   Number of obs   =        250 
 LR chi2(13)     =      67.12 
 Prob > chi2     =     0.0000 
Log likelihood =  -135.4686                       Pseudo R2       =     0.1986 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
pdpviolation |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
 time0 |  -.0356656   1.185949    -0.03   0.976    -2.360084    2.288753 
 time1 |   1.152786   .4726881     2.44   0.015     .2263348    2.079238 
 time3 |   .9173286   .4544557     2.02   0.044     .0266119    1.808045 
 time4 |  -.0693617   .3916451    -0.18   0.859     -.836972    .6982486 
 distct |   .6882161   .3453598     1.99   0.046     .0113233    1.365109 
 concurrence |  -.0820492   .6647698    -0.12   0.902    -1.384974    1.220876 
 dissent |   1.554792   .7841484     1.98   0.047     .0178893    3.091694 
 wealthindic |   .5795827   .3388218     1.71   0.087    -.0844958    1.243661 
 hardship |   1.760441   .4157874     4.23   0.000     .9455129     2.57537 
officialpr~s |   .8177788   .4088889     2.00   0.045     .0163713    1.619186 
altfeasibi~y |  -.9188401   .4694298    -1.96   0.050    -1.838906    .0012254 
 wrongact |   .4402515   .3195875     1.38   0.168    -.1861284    1.066631 
ctaclearli~t |   .7802598   1.387583     0.56   0.574    -1.939353    3.499872 





. logit  pdpviolation time0 time1 time2 time4 distct  concurrence dissent wealth 
> indic hardship officialprocedures altfeasibility wrongact ctaclearlibpropinter 
> est 
 
Iteration 0:   log likelihood = -169.03059 
Iteration 1:   log likelihood = -136.57547 
Iteration 2:   log likelihood =  -135.4814 
Iteration 3:   log likelihood =  -135.4686 
Iteration 4:   log likelihood =  -135.4686 
 
Logit estimates                                   Number of obs   =        250 
 LR chi2(13)     =      67.12 
 Prob > chi2     =     0.0000 
Log likelihood =  -135.4686                       Pseudo R2       =     0.1986 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
pdpviolation |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
 time0 |  -.9529942   1.200618    -0.79   0.427    -3.306163    1.400174 
 time1 |   .2354578   .5057791     0.47   0.642     -.755851    1.226767 
 time2 |  -.9173286   .4544557    -2.02   0.044    -1.808045   -.0266119 
 time4 |  -.9866903   .4430233    -2.23   0.026       -1.855   -.1183805 
 distct |   .6882161   .3453598     1.99   0.046     .0113233    1.365109 
 concurrence |  -.0820492   .6647698    -0.12   0.902    -1.384974    1.220876 
 dissent |   1.554792   .7841484     1.98   0.047     .0178893    3.091694 
 wealthindic |   .5795827   .3388218     1.71   0.087    -.0844958    1.243661 
 hardship |   1.760441   .4157874     4.23   0.000     .9455129     2.57537 
officialpr~s |   .8177788   .4088889     2.00   0.045     .0163713    1.619186 
altfeasibi~y |  -.9188401   .4694298    -1.96   0.050    -1.838906    .0012254 
 wrongact |   .4402515   .3195875     1.38   0.168    -.1861284    1.066631 
ctaclearli~t |   .7802598   1.387583     0.56   0.574    -1.939353    3.499872 





. logit  pdpviolation time0 time1 time2 time3 distct  concurrence dissent wealth 
> indic hardship officialprocedures altfeasibility wrongact ctaclearlibpropinter 
> est 
 
Iteration 0:   log likelihood = -169.03059 
Iteration 1:   log likelihood = -136.57547 
Iteration 2:   log likelihood =  -135.4814 
Iteration 3:   log likelihood =  -135.4686 
Iteration 4:   log likelihood =  -135.4686 
 
Logit estimates                                   Number of obs   =        250 
 LR chi2(13)     =      67.12 
 Prob > chi2     =     0.0000 
Log likelihood =  -135.4686                       Pseudo R2       =     0.1986 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
pdpviolation |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
 time0 |   .0336961   1.173777     0.03   0.977    -2.266865    2.334257 
 time1 |   1.222148   .4599841     2.66   0.008     .3205957      2.1237 
 time2 |   .0693617   .3916451     0.18   0.859    -.6982486     .836972 
 time3 |   .9866903   .4430233     2.23   0.026     .1183805       1.855 
 distct |   .6882161   .3453598     1.99   0.046     .0113233    1.365109 
concurrence |  -.0820492   .6647698    -0.12   0.902    -1.384974    1.220876 
 dissent |   1.554792   .7841484     1.98   0.047     .0178893    3.091694 
 wealthindic |   .5795827   .3388218     1.71   0.087    -.0844958    1.243661 
 hardship |   1.760441   .4157874     4.23   0.000     .9455129     2.57537 
officialpr~s |   .8177788   .4088889     2.00   0.045     .0163713    1.619186 
altfeasibi~y |  -.9188401   .4694298    -1.96   0.050    -1.838906    .0012254 
wrongact |   .4402515   .3195875     1.38   0.168    -.1861284    1.066631 
ctaclearli~t |   .7802598   1.387583     0.56   0.574    -1.939353    3.499872 








. logit  pdpviolation time1 time2 time3 time4 distct  concurrence dissent wealth 
> indic hardship officialprocedures altfeasibility wrongact  eximportant 
 
Iteration 0:   log likelihood = -168.50495 
Iteration 1:   log likelihood = -134.82882 
Iteration 2:   log likelihood = -133.46312 
Iteration 3:   log likelihood =  -133.4423 
Iteration 4:   log likelihood =  -133.4423 
 
Logit estimates                                   Number of obs   =        249 
 LR chi2(13)     =      70.13 
 Prob > chi2     =     0.0000 
Log likelihood =  -133.4423                       Pseudo R2       =     0.2081 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
pdpviolation |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
 time1 |   1.088071   1.212977     0.90   0.370    -1.289321    3.465463 
 time2 |   .0103122   1.192672     0.01   0.993    -2.327282    2.347906 
 time3 |   .9290202   1.207459     0.77   0.442    -1.437556    3.295596 
 time4 |  -.0623998   1.180096    -0.05   0.958    -2.375346    2.250546 
 distct |    .790259    .350573     2.25   0.024     .1031485    1.477369 
 concurrence |    .020539   .6688212     0.03   0.976    -1.290326    1.331404 
 dissent |   1.698723   .7782188     2.18   0.029     .1734418    3.224003 
 wealthindic |    .577021   .3418219     1.69   0.091    -.0929377     1.24698 
 hardship |   1.641176    .420326     3.90   0.000      .817352       2.465 
officialpr~s |   .8737504   .4181316     2.09   0.037     .0542275    1.693273 
altfeasibi~y |  -1.011117   .4807629    -2.10   0.035    -1.953395   -.0688395 
 wrongact |   .4079289   .3213811     1.27   0.204    -.2219664    1.037824 
 eximportant |   1.269013   .6612072     1.92   0.055    -.0269296    2.564955 





. logit  pdpviolation time0 time2 time3 time4 distct  concurrence dissent wealth 
> indic hardship officialprocedures altfeasibility wrongact  eximportant 
 
Iteration 0:   log likelihood = -168.50495 
Iteration 1:   log likelihood = -134.82882 
Iteration 2:   log likelihood = -133.46312 
Iteration 3:   log likelihood =  -133.4423 
Iteration 4:   log likelihood =  -133.4423 
 
Logit estimates                                   Number of obs   =        249 
 LR chi2(13)     =      70.13 
 Prob > chi2     =     0.0000 
Log likelihood =  -133.4423                       Pseudo R2       =     0.2081 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
pdpviolation |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
 time0 |  -1.088071   1.212977    -0.90   0.370    -3.465463    1.289321 
 time2 |  -1.077759   .4797279    -2.25   0.025    -2.018008   -.1375095 
 time3 |  -.1590509   .5107047    -0.31   0.755    -1.160014    .8419119 
 time4 |  -1.150471   .4636163    -2.48   0.013    -2.059142   -.2417997 
 distct |    .790259    .350573     2.25   0.024     .1031485    1.477369 
 concurrence |    .020539   .6688212     0.03   0.976    -1.290326    1.331404 
 dissent |   1.698723   .7782188     2.18   0.029     .1734418    3.224003 
 wealthindic |    .577021   .3418219     1.69   0.091    -.0929377     1.24698 
 hardship |   1.641176    .420326     3.90   0.000      .817352       2.465 
officialpr~s |   .8737504   .4181316     2.09   0.037     .0542275    1.693273 
altfeasibi~y |  -1.011117   .4807629    -2.10   0.035    -1.953395   -.0688395 
 wrongact |   .4079289   .3213811     1.27   0.204    -.2219664    1.037824 
 eximportant |   1.269013   .6612072     1.92   0.055    -.0269296    2.564955 





. logit  pdpviolation time0 time1 time3 time4 distct  concurrence dissent wealth 
> indic hardship officialprocedures altfeasibility wrongact  eximportant 
 
Iteration 0:   log likelihood = -168.50495 
Iteration 1:   log likelihood = -134.82882 
Iteration 2:   log likelihood = -133.46312 
Iteration 3:   log likelihood =  -133.4423 
Iteration 4:   log likelihood =  -133.4423 
 
Logit estimates                                   Number of obs   =        249 
 LR chi2(13)     =      70.13 
 Prob > chi2     =     0.0000 
Log likelihood =  -133.4423                       Pseudo R2       =     0.2081 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
pdpviolation |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
 time0 |  -.0103122   1.192672    -0.01   0.993    -2.347906    2.327282 
 time1 |   1.077759   .4797279     2.25   0.025     .1375095    2.018008 
 time3 |    .918708   .4572805     2.01   0.045     .0224546    1.814961 
 time4 |   -.072712   .3933834    -0.18   0.853    -.8437293    .6983052 
 distct |    .790259    .350573     2.25   0.024     .1031485    1.477369 
 concurrence |    .020539   .6688212     0.03   0.976    -1.290326    1.331404 
 dissent |   1.698723   .7782188     2.18   0.029     .1734418    3.224003 
 wealthindic |    .577021   .3418219     1.69   0.091    -.0929377     1.24698 
 hardship |   1.641176    .420326     3.90   0.000      .817352       2.465 
officialpr~s |   .8737504   .4181316     2.09   0.037     .0542275    1.693273 
altfeasibi~y |  -1.011117   .4807629    -2.10   0.035    -1.953395   -.0688395 
 wrongact |   .4079289   .3213811     1.27   0.204    -.2219664    1.037824 
 eximportant |   1.269013   .6612072     1.92   0.055    -.0269296    2.564955 





. logit  pdpviolation time0 time1 time2 time4 distct  concurrence dissent wealth 
> indic hardship officialprocedures altfeasibility wrongact  eximportant 
 
Iteration 0:   log likelihood = -168.50495 
Iteration 1:   log likelihood = -134.82882 
Iteration 2:   log likelihood = -133.46312 
Iteration 3:   log likelihood =  -133.4423 
Iteration 4:   log likelihood =  -133.4423 
 
Logit estimates                                   Number of obs   =        249 
 LR chi2(13)     =      70.13 
 Prob > chi2     =     0.0000 
Log likelihood =  -133.4423                       Pseudo R2       =     0.2081 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
pdpviolation |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
 time0 |  -.9290202   1.207459    -0.77   0.442    -3.295596    1.437556 
 time1 |   .1590509   .5107047     0.31   0.755    -.8419119    1.160014 
 time2 |   -.918708   .4572805    -2.01   0.045    -1.814961   -.0224546 
 time4 |    -.99142   .4432408    -2.24   0.025    -1.860156   -.1226841 
 distct |    .790259    .350573     2.25   0.024     .1031485    1.477369 
 concurrence |    .020539   .6688212     0.03   0.976    -1.290326    1.331404 
 dissent |   1.698723   .7782188     2.18   0.029     .1734418    3.224003 
 wealthindic |    .577021   .3418219     1.69   0.091    -.0929377     1.24698 
 hardship |   1.641176    .420326     3.90   0.000      .817352       2.465 
officialpr~s |   .8737504   .4181316     2.09   0.037     .0542275    1.693273 
altfeasibi~y |  -1.011117   .4807629    -2.10   0.035    -1.953395   -.0688395 
 wrongact |   .4079289   .3213811     1.27   0.204    -.2219664    1.037824 
 eximportant |   1.269013   .6612072     1.92   0.055    -.0269296    2.564955 





. logit  pdpviolation time0 time1 time2 time3 distct  concurrence dissent wealth 
> indic hardship officialprocedures altfeasibility wrongact  eximportant 
 
Iteration 0:   log likelihood = -168.50495 
Iteration 1:   log likelihood = -134.82882 
Iteration 2:   log likelihood = -133.46312 
Iteration 3:   log likelihood =  -133.4423 
Iteration 4:   log likelihood =  -133.4423 
 
Logit estimates                                   Number of obs   =        249 
 LR chi2(13)     =      70.13 
 Prob > chi2     =     0.0000 
Log likelihood =  -133.4423                       Pseudo R2       =     0.2081 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
pdpviolation |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
 time0 |   .0623998   1.180096     0.05   0.958    -2.250546    2.375346 
 time1 |   1.150471   .4636163     2.48   0.013     .2417997    2.059142 
 time2 |    .072712   .3933834     0.18   0.853    -.6983052    .8437293 
 time3 |     .99142   .4432408     2.24   0.025     .1226841    1.860156 
 distct |    .790259    .350573     2.25   0.024     .1031485    1.477369 
 concurrence |    .020539   .6688212     0.03   0.976    -1.290326    1.331404 
 dissent |   1.698723   .7782188     2.18   0.029     .1734418    3.224003 
 wealthindic |    .577021   .3418219     1.69   0.091    -.0929377     1.24698 
 hardship |   1.641176    .420326     3.90   0.000      .817352       2.465 
officialpr~s |   .8737504   .4181316     2.09   0.037     .0542275    1.693273 
altfeasibi~y |  -1.011117   .4807629    -2.10   0.035    -1.953395   -.0688395 
 wrongact |   .4079289   .3213811     1.27   0.204    -.2219664    1.037824 
 eximportant |   1.269013   .6612072     1.92   0.055    -.0269296    2.564955 








. logit  pdpviolation time1 time2 time3 time4 distct  concurrence dissent wealth 
> indic hardship officialprocedures altfeasibility wrongact sctclearlibpropinter 
> est eximportant 
 
Iteration 0:   log likelihood = -168.50495 
Iteration 1:   log likelihood = -111.68152 
Iteration 2:   log likelihood = -104.16018 
Iteration 3:   log likelihood = -102.86365 
Iteration 4:   log likelihood = -102.76719 
Iteration 5:   log likelihood = -102.76619 
Iteration 6:   log likelihood = -102.76619 
 
Logit estimates                                   Number of obs   =        249 
 LR chi2(14)     =     131.48 
 Prob > chi2     =     0.0000 
Log likelihood = -102.76619                       Pseudo R2       =     0.3901 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
pdpviolation |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
 time1 |   1.088405   1.256339     0.87   0.386    -1.373975    3.550784 
 time2 |   .1275675    1.21896     0.10   0.917    -2.261551    2.516686 
 time3 |   .3819142    1.23704     0.31   0.758     -2.04264    2.806469 
 time4 |  -.2348824   1.208451    -0.19   0.846    -2.603403    2.133638 
 distct |   .0264787   .4090754     0.06   0.948    -.7752943    .8282518 
 concurrence |  -.4038879   .7828901    -0.52   0.606    -1.938324    1.130549 
 dissent |   2.469546   1.052691     2.35   0.019     .4063106    4.532782 
 wealthindic |   .0378734   .3917092     0.10   0.923    -.7298626    .8056093 
 hardship |   1.728565   .4917256     3.52   0.000     .7648004    2.692329 
officialpr~s |  -.2334184   .5431164    -0.43   0.667    -1.297907    .8310701 
altfeasibi~y |  -1.792751   .5697734    -3.15   0.002    -2.909486   -.6760154 
 wrongact |   .1910731   .3650195     0.52   0.601     -.524352    .9064982 
sctclearli~t |   4.052446   .7407699     5.47   0.000     2.600563    5.504328 
 eximportant |   3.018099   .9084399     3.32   0.001      1.23759    4.798609 





. logit  pdpviolation time0 time2 time3 time4 distct  concurrence dissent wealth 
> indic hardship officialprocedures altfeasibility wrongact sctclearlibpropinter 
> est eximportant 
 
Iteration 0:   log likelihood = -168.50495 
Iteration 1:   log likelihood = -111.68152 
Iteration 2:   log likelihood = -104.16018 
Iteration 3:   log likelihood = -102.86365 
Iteration 4:   log likelihood = -102.76719 
Iteration 5:   log likelihood = -102.76619 
Iteration 6:   log likelihood = -102.76619 
 
Logit estimates                                   Number of obs   =        249 
 LR chi2(14)     =     131.48 
 Prob > chi2     =     0.0000 
Log likelihood = -102.76619                       Pseudo R2       =     0.3901 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
pdpviolation |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
 time0 |  -1.088405   1.256339    -0.87   0.386    -3.550784    1.373975 
 time2 |  -.9608371    .583786    -1.65   0.100    -2.105037    .1833625 
 time3 |  -.7064904   .6099192    -1.16   0.247     -1.90191    .4889293 
 time4 |  -1.323287   .5662723    -2.34   0.019     -2.43316   -.2134136 
 distct |   .0264787   .4090754     0.06   0.948    -.7752943    .8282518 
 concurrence |  -.4038879   .7828901    -0.52   0.606    -1.938324    1.130549 
 dissent |   2.469546   1.052691     2.35   0.019     .4063106    4.532782 
 wealthindic |   .0378734   .3917092     0.10   0.923    -.7298626    .8056093 
 hardship |   1.728565   .4917256     3.52   0.000     .7648004    2.692329 
officialpr~s |  -.2334184   .5431164    -0.43   0.667    -1.297907    .8310701 
altfeasibi~y |  -1.792751   .5697734    -3.15   0.002    -2.909486   -.6760154 
 wrongact |   .1910731   .3650195     0.52   0.601     -.524352    .9064982 
sctclearli~t |   4.052446   .7407699     5.47   0.000     2.600563    5.504328 
 eximportant |   3.018099   .9084399     3.32   0.001      1.23759    4.798609 





. logit  pdpviolation time0 time1 time3 time4 distct  concurrence dissent wealth 
> indic hardship officialprocedures altfeasibility wrongact sctclearlibpropinter 
> est eximportant 
 
Iteration 0:   log likelihood = -168.50495 
Iteration 1:   log likelihood = -111.68152 
Iteration 2:   log likelihood = -104.16018 
Iteration 3:   log likelihood = -102.86365 
Iteration 4:   log likelihood = -102.76719 
Iteration 5:   log likelihood = -102.76619 
Iteration 6:   log likelihood = -102.76619 
 
Logit estimates                                   Number of obs   =        249 
 LR chi2(14)     =     131.48 
 Prob > chi2     =     0.0000 
Log likelihood = -102.76619                       Pseudo R2       =     0.3901 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
pdpviolation |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
 time0 |  -.1275675    1.21896    -0.10   0.917    -2.516686    2.261551 
 time1 |   .9608371    .583786     1.65   0.100    -.1833625    2.105037 
 time3 |   .2543467   .5236024     0.49   0.627    -.7718952    1.280589 
 time4 |  -.3624499   .4535099    -0.80   0.424    -1.251313    .5264131 
 distct |   .0264787   .4090754     0.06   0.948    -.7752943    .8282518 
 concurrence |  -.4038879   .7828901    -0.52   0.606    -1.938324    1.130549 
 dissent |   2.469546   1.052691     2.35   0.019     .4063106    4.532782 
 wealthindic |   .0378734   .3917092     0.10   0.923    -.7298626    .8056093 
 hardship |   1.728565   .4917256     3.52   0.000     .7648004    2.692329 
officialpr~s |  -.2334184   .5431164    -0.43   0.667    -1.297907    .8310701 
altfeasibi~y |  -1.792751   .5697734    -3.15   0.002    -2.909486   -.6760154 
 wrongact |   .1910731   .3650195     0.52   0.601     -.524352    .9064982 
sctclearli~t |   4.052446   .7407699     5.47   0.000     2.600563    5.504328 
 eximportant |   3.018099   .9084399     3.32   0.001      1.23759    4.798609 





. logit  pdpviolation time0 time1 time3 time4 distct  concurrence dissent wealth 
> indic hardship officialprocedures altfeasibility wrongact sctclearlibpropinter 
> est eximportant 
 
Iteration 0:   log likelihood = -168.50495 
Iteration 1:   log likelihood = -111.68152 
Iteration 2:   log likelihood = -104.16018 
Iteration 3:   log likelihood = -102.86365 
Iteration 4:   log likelihood = -102.76719 
Iteration 5:   log likelihood = -102.76619 
Iteration 6:   log likelihood = -102.76619 
 
Logit estimates                                   Number of obs   =        249 
 LR chi2(14)     =     131.48 
 Prob > chi2     =     0.0000 
Log likelihood = -102.76619                       Pseudo R2       =     0.3901 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
pdpviolation |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
 time0 |  -.1275675    1.21896    -0.10   0.917    -2.516686    2.261551 
 time1 |   .9608371    .583786     1.65   0.100    -.1833625    2.105037 
 time3 |   .2543467   .5236024     0.49   0.627    -.7718952    1.280589 
 time4 |  -.3624499   .4535099    -0.80   0.424    -1.251313    .5264131 
 distct |   .0264787   .4090754     0.06   0.948    -.7752943    .8282518 
 concurrence |  -.4038879   .7828901    -0.52   0.606    -1.938324    1.130549 
 dissent |   2.469546   1.052691     2.35   0.019     .4063106    4.532782 
 wealthindic |   .0378734   .3917092     0.10   0.923    -.7298626    .8056093 
 hardship |   1.728565   .4917256     3.52   0.000     .7648004    2.692329 
officialpr~s |  -.2334184   .5431164    -0.43   0.667    -1.297907    .8310701 
altfeasibi~y |  -1.792751   .5697734    -3.15   0.002    -2.909486   -.6760154 
 wrongact |   .1910731   .3650195     0.52   0.601     -.524352    .9064982 
sctclearli~t |   4.052446   .7407699     5.47   0.000     2.600563    5.504328 
 eximportant |   3.018099   .9084399     3.32   0.001      1.23759    4.798609 





. logit  pdpviolation time0 time1 time2 time3 distct  concurrence dissent wealth 
> indic hardship officialprocedures altfeasibility wrongact sctclearlibpropinter 
> est eximportant 
 
Iteration 0:   log likelihood = -168.50495 
Iteration 1:   log likelihood = -111.68152 
Iteration 2:   log likelihood = -104.16018 
Iteration 3:   log likelihood = -102.86365 
Iteration 4:   log likelihood = -102.76719 
Iteration 5:   log likelihood = -102.76619 
Iteration 6:   log likelihood = -102.76619 
 
Logit estimates                                   Number of obs   =        249 
 LR chi2(14)     =     131.48 
 Prob > chi2     =     0.0000 
Log likelihood = -102.76619                       Pseudo R2       =     0.3901 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
pdpviolation |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
 time0 |   .2348824   1.208451     0.19   0.846    -2.133638    2.603403 
 time1 |   1.323287   .5662723     2.34   0.019     .2134136     2.43316 
 time2 |   .3624499   .4535099     0.80   0.424    -.5264131    1.251313 
 time3 |   .6167966   .5009081     1.23   0.218    -.3649652    1.598558 
 distct |   .0264787   .4090754     0.06   0.948    -.7752943    .8282518 
 concurrence |  -.4038879   .7828901    -0.52   0.606    -1.938324    1.130549 
 dissent |   2.469546   1.052691     2.35   0.019     .4063106    4.532782 
 wealthindic |   .0378734   .3917092     0.10   0.923    -.7298626    .8056093 
 hardship |   1.728565   .4917256     3.52   0.000     .7648004    2.692329 
officialpr~s |  -.2334184   .5431164    -0.43   0.667    -1.297907    .8310701 
altfeasibi~y |  -1.792751   .5697734    -3.15   0.002    -2.909486   -.6760154 
 wrongact |   .1910731   .3650195     0.52   0.601     -.524352    .9064982 
sctclearli~t |   4.052446   .7407699     5.47   0.000     2.600563    5.504328 
 eximportant |   3.018099   .9084399     3.32   0.001      1.23759    4.798609 








. logit  pdpviolation time1 time2 time3 time4 distct  concurrence dissent wealth 
> indic hardship officialprocedures altfeasibility wrongact ctaclearlibpropinter 
> est eximportant 
 
Iteration 0:   log likelihood = -168.50495 
Iteration 1:   log likelihood = -134.71498 
Iteration 2:   log likelihood =  -133.3247 
Iteration 3:   log likelihood = -133.30226 
Iteration 4:   log likelihood = -133.30225 
 
Logit estimates                                   Number of obs   =        249 
 LR chi2(14)     =      70.41 
 Prob > chi2     =     0.0000 
Log likelihood = -133.30225                       Pseudo R2       =     0.2089 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
pdpviolation |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
 time1 |   1.088267    1.21351     0.90   0.370    -1.290169    3.466703 
 time2 |   .0157067   1.193089     0.01   0.989    -2.322704    2.354118 
 time3 |   .9361479   1.207998     0.77   0.438    -1.431484     3.30378 
 time4 |  -.0784208   1.180921    -0.07   0.947    -2.392983    2.236141 
 distct |   .7998597   .3513352     2.28   0.023     .1112553    1.488464 
 concurrence |   .0561615   .6757996     0.08   0.934    -1.268381    1.380704 
 dissent |    1.59175   .8034378     1.98   0.048     .0170406    3.166459 
 wealthindic |   .5860855   .3424508     1.71   0.087    -.0851058    1.257277 
 hardship |   1.637784   .4204478     3.90   0.000     .8137211    2.461846 
officialpr~s |    .869813   .4179616     2.08   0.037     .0506233    1.689003 
altfeasibi~y |  -1.006703   .4808225    -2.09   0.036    -1.949097   -.0643079 
wrongact |   .3939872   .3223238     1.22   0.222    -.2377558     1.02573 
ctaclearli~t |   .7606805   1.460791     0.52   0.603    -2.102417    3.623778 
 eximportant |   1.266209   .6635819     1.91   0.056    -.0343875    2.566806 





. logit  pdpviolation time0 time2 time3 time4 distct  concurrence dissent wealth 
> indic hardship officialprocedures altfeasibility wrongact ctaclearlibpropinter 
> est eximportant 
 
Iteration 0:   log likelihood = -168.50495 
Iteration 1:   log likelihood = -134.71498 
Iteration 2:   log likelihood =  -133.3247 
Iteration 3:   log likelihood = -133.30226 
Iteration 4:   log likelihood = -133.30225 
 
Logit estimates                                   Number of obs   =        249 
 LR chi2(14)     =      70.41 
 Prob > chi2     =     0.0000 
Log likelihood = -133.30225                       Pseudo R2       =     0.2089 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
pdpviolation |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
 time0 |  -1.088267    1.21351    -0.90   0.370    -3.466703    1.290169 
 time2 |   -1.07256   .4800266    -2.23   0.025    -2.013395   -.1317255 
 time3 |   -.152119   .5106059    -0.30   0.766    -1.152888    .8486501 
 time4 |  -1.166688   .4654938    -2.51   0.012    -2.079039   -.2543367 
 distct |   .7998597   .3513352     2.28   0.023     .1112553    1.488464 
 concurrence |   .0561615   .6757996     0.08   0.934    -1.268381    1.380704 
 dissent |    1.59175   .8034378     1.98   0.048     .0170406    3.166459 
 wealthindic |   .5860855   .3424508     1.71   0.087    -.0851058    1.257277 
 hardship |   1.637784   .4204478     3.90   0.000     .8137211    2.461846 
officialpr~s |    .869813   .4179616     2.08   0.037     .0506233    1.689003 
altfeasibi~y |  -1.006703   .4808225    -2.09   0.036    -1.949097   -.0643079 
 wrongact |   .3939872   .3223238     1.22   0.222    -.2377558     1.02573 
ctaclearli~t |   .7606805   1.460791     0.52   0.603    -2.102417    3.623778 
 eximportant |   1.266209   .6635819     1.91   0.056    -.0343875    2.566806 





. logit  pdpviolation time0 time1 time3 time4 distct  concurrence dissent wealth 
> indic hardship officialprocedures altfeasibility wrongact ctaclearlibpropinter 
> est eximportant 
 
Iteration 0:   log likelihood = -168.50495 
Iteration 1:   log likelihood = -134.71498 
Iteration 2:   log likelihood =  -133.3247 
Iteration 3:   log likelihood = -133.30226 
Iteration 4:   log likelihood = -133.30225 
 
Logit estimates                                   Number of obs   =        249 
 LR chi2(14)     =      70.41 
 Prob > chi2     =     0.0000 
Log likelihood = -133.30225                       Pseudo R2       =     0.2089 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
pdpviolation |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
 time0 |  -.0157067   1.193089    -0.01   0.989    -2.354118    2.322704 
 time1 |    1.07256   .4800266     2.23   0.025     .1317255    2.013395 
 time3 |   .9204413   .4571768     2.01   0.044     .0243912    1.816491 
 time4 |  -.0941274   .3958257    -0.24   0.812    -.8699315    .6816767 
 distct |   .7998597   .3513352     2.28   0.023     .1112553    1.488464 
 concurrence |   .0561615   .6757996     0.08   0.934    -1.268381    1.380704 
 dissent |    1.59175   .8034378     1.98   0.048     .0170406    3.166459 
 wealthindic |   .5860855   .3424508     1.71   0.087    -.0851058    1.257277 
 hardship |   1.637784   .4204478     3.90   0.000     .8137211    2.461846 
officialpr~s |    .869813   .4179616     2.08   0.037     .0506233    1.689003 
altfeasibi~y |  -1.006703   .4808225    -2.09   0.036    -1.949097   -.0643079 
 wrongact |   .3939872   .3223238     1.22   0.222    -.2377558     1.02573 
ctaclearli~t |   .7606805   1.460791     0.52   0.603    -2.102417    3.623778 
 eximportant |   1.266209   .6635819     1.91   0.056    -.0343875    2.566806 





. logit  pdpviolation time0 time1 time2 time4 distct  concurrence dissent wealth 
> indic hardship officialprocedures altfeasibility wrongact ctaclearlibpropinter 
> est eximportant 
 
Iteration 0:   log likelihood = -168.50495 
Iteration 1:   log likelihood = -134.71498 
Iteration 2:   log likelihood =  -133.3247 
Iteration 3:   log likelihood = -133.30226 
Iteration 4:   log likelihood = -133.30225 
 
Logit estimates                                   Number of obs   =        249 
 LR chi2(14)     =      70.41 
 Prob > chi2     =     0.0000 
Log likelihood = -133.30225                       Pseudo R2       =     0.2089 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
pdpviolation |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
 time0 |  -.9361479   1.207998    -0.77   0.438     -3.30378    1.431484 
 time1 |    .152119   .5106059     0.30   0.766    -.8486501    1.152888 
 time2 |  -.9204413   .4571768    -2.01   0.044    -1.816491   -.0243912 
 time4 |  -1.014569   .4459741    -2.27   0.023    -1.888662   -.1404755 
 distct |   .7998597   .3513352     2.28   0.023     .1112553    1.488464 
 concurrence |   .0561615   .6757996     0.08   0.934    -1.268381    1.380704 
 dissent |    1.59175   .8034378     1.98   0.048     .0170406    3.166459 
 wealthindic |   .5860855   .3424508     1.71   0.087    -.0851058    1.257277 
 hardship |   1.637784   .4204478     3.90   0.000     .8137211    2.461846 
officialpr~s |    .869813   .4179616     2.08   0.037     .0506233    1.689003 
altfeasibi~y |  -1.006703   .4808225    -2.09   0.036    -1.949097   -.0643079 
 wrongact |   .3939872   .3223238     1.22   0.222    -.2377558     1.02573 
ctaclearli~t |   .7606805   1.460791     0.52   0.603    -2.102417    3.623778 
 eximportant |   1.266209   .6635819     1.91   0.056    -.0343875    2.566806 





. logit  pdpviolation time0 time1 time2 time3 distct  concurrence dissent wealth 
> indic hardship officialprocedures altfeasibility wrongact ctaclearlibpropinter 
> est eximportant 
 
Iteration 0:   log likelihood = -168.50495 
Iteration 1:   log likelihood = -134.71498 
Iteration 2:   log likelihood =  -133.3247 
Iteration 3:   log likelihood = -133.30226 
Iteration 4:   log likelihood = -133.30225 
 
Logit estimates                                   Number of obs   =        249 
 LR chi2(14)     =      70.41 
 Prob > chi2     =     0.0000 
Log likelihood = -133.30225                       Pseudo R2       =     0.2089 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
pdpviolation |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
 time0 |   .0784208   1.180921     0.07   0.947    -2.236141    2.392983 
 time1 |   1.166688   .4654938     2.51   0.012     .2543367    2.079039 
 time2 |   .0941274   .3958257     0.24   0.812    -.6816767    .8699315 
 time3 |   1.014569   .4459741     2.27   0.023     .1404755    1.888662 
 distct |   .7998597   .3513352     2.28   0.023     .1112553    1.488464 
 concurrence |   .0561615   .6757996     0.08   0.934    -1.268381    1.380704 
 dissent |    1.59175   .8034378     1.98   0.048     .0170406    3.166459 
 wealthindic |   .5860855   .3424508     1.71   0.087    -.0851058    1.257277 
 hardship |   1.637784   .4204478     3.90   0.000     .8137211    2.461846 
officialpr~s |    .869813   .4179616     2.08   0.037     .0506233    1.689003 
altfeasibi~y |  -1.006703   .4808225    -2.09   0.036    -1.949097   -.0643079 
 wrongact |   .3939872   .3223238     1.22   0.222    -.2377558     1.02573 
ctaclearli~t |   .7606805   1.460791     0.52   0.603    -2.102417    3.623778 
 eximportant |   1.266209   .6635819     1.91   0.056    -.0343875    2.566806 
 _cons |  -2.584946   .5249092    -4.92   0.000    -3.613749   -1.556143 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
